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This thesis is a collection of three research papers. The first paper is a col-
laboration with my supervisor about non-convexities in general equilibrium. Non-
convexities and discrete choices have become important modeling tools in modern
macro-economics. Unfortunately, existence of competitive equilibria in the presence
of such non-convexities is not always ensured and most results on the existence of
equilibrium that can be found in the literature consider a very general model and are
not directly applicable to the macro-models used in the literature. In this paper we
explain the three main problems one needs to face when proving existence and give
simple sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive equilibria in stochastic
OLG models with discrete choices and non-convex preferences. We also consider a
version of the model without aggregate uncertainty but with bankruptcy and default
and prove existence of a steady state equilibrium.
The second and third papers are about bounded rational recursive equilibrium.
The second paper is a theoretical existence result and the third paper is an application
to solve macro-finance puzzles.
The second paper provides a general way of modeling bounded rationality in
the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework with infinitely lived heteroge-
neous agents and incomplete markets. Different from a rational agent, a bounded
rational agent is associated with an extra parameter ǫ, which can be interpreted as
the “level of irrationality”. The bounded rational agent does not know the true prob-
ability distribution of the economy fundamentals. To make decisions, the bounded
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rational agent forms a belief of a stationary distribution of the fundamentals and then
use the Markov transition associated with it to maximize utility. If a distribution of
the fundamentals stays “closer” to its next-period transition than ǫ, the agent would
consider it as ǫ-stationary. In equilibrium, each agent maximizes utility with an ǫ-
stationary belief and markets clear. The main theorem of this paper shows that for
any strictly positive ǫ, a recursive equilibrium exists. This result provides a potential
way of measuring the “level of irrationality” for many behavioral models. Besides,
there are two applications for a special case of the model, when ǫ is extremely close to
zero: It lays foundation for numerically computed equilibria of models with the ratio-
nal expectation assumption; and it can be viewed as an epsilon-equilibrium existence
result for models with heterogeneous heuristics.
The third paper provides a simple dynamic general equilibrium model that can
generate short-term momentum and long-term reversal effect of excess stock returns
with incomplete markets due to collateral constraints. The model also helps to un-
derstand quantitatively some of the puzzling empirical regularities in macro-finance
stated by Campbell (2003) and Gabiax (2012). We assume there are two types of
bounded rational agents: the fundamentalists and the speculators. The fundamen-
talists believes that future asset prices are determined by the exogenous shocks and
dividends. The speculator believes the excess stock return has a short-term momen-
tum and long-term reversal regardless of exogenous shocks. These beliefs are not
common knowledge. In equilibrium, both agents maximize utilities with these beliefs
and markets clear. Both types of agents are bounded rational in the sense that they
both partially capture the law of motion of the asset prices in equilibrium. We show
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that in calibrated simulations, both types of agents survive and there is a significant
short-term momentum of excess stock returns. The calibrated data helps to explain
eleven puzzling empirical regularities.
Chapter 1
Existence of equilibrium in stochastic overlapping generations economies
with nonconvexities
Non-convexities and discrete choices have become important modeling tools
in modern macro-economics. Unfortunately, existence of competitive equilibria in
the presence of such non-convexities is not always ensured and most results on the
existence of equilibrium that can be found in the literature consider a very general
model and are not directly applicable to the macro-models used in the literature.
In this paper we explain the three main problems one needs to face when
proving existence and give simple sufficient conditions for the existence of competitive
equilibria in stochastic OLG models with discrete choices and non-convex preferences.
We also consider a version of the model without aggregate uncertainty but with
bankruptcy and default and prove existence of a steady state equilibrium.
Introduction
In this paper we derive simple sufficient conditions for the existence of equilib-
ria in dynamic stochastic models with non-convexities in budget-sets and preferences.
Households make many important discrete decisions over the life-cycle. Examples of
such decisions include investment in human capital, labor-supply decisions, housing
decisions, and bankruptcy- or default decisions. Consequently, there are now many
applied dynamic general equilibrium models where agents make discrete choices (see
e.g. Chatterjee et al. (2001), Chang and Kim (2007), Chambers et al. (2009) Kumhof
et al. (2015), Sommer and Sullivan (2018), among many others). While Chatterjee
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et a. (2001) carefully prove existence of a competitive equilibria by assuming that all
choices are discrete, most of the other literature takes existence as given. Unfortu-
nately this is not always an innocuous assumption.
Three technical issues arise when one introduces discrete choices into a stan-
dard dynamic stochastic model with heterogeneous agents. First, individual best
responses are not longer convex-valued. Following Aumann (1964) and Starr(1969)
who establish the existence of Arrow Debreu equilibria in economies with non-convex
preferences the assumption of a continuum of agents is crucial to ensure convexity
of the best response correspondences. Second, individual budget-correspondences are
no longer continuous and choices can fail to be upper-hemi-continuous. As Mas-Colell
(1976) points out, in many models with discrete decisions (in his paper the indivisi-
ble commodity case) a continuum of agents alone does not guarantee existence. He
presents a simple example that illustrates that non-convexity of consumption sets can
lead to non-existence even with a continuum of agents and derives condition on the
distribution of agents’ characteristics that are sufficient for existence. Third in models
with infinitely many commodities and a continuum of agents general existence proofs
are often technically difficult and require very specific assumptions on preferences
and the commodity space (see, e.g., Ostroy (1984)). We circumvent many of the
technical problems by considering models with finitely lived agents and overlapping
generations.
In this paper we prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a general
dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations, non-convex pref-
erences, and discrete decisions. Ex ante identical agents distinguish themselves ex
6
post by their choices. Our key insight is to model discrete decisions by assuming
that agents choose a sequence of intertemporal budget sets. We present a series of
simple and natural assumptions that guarantee that best responses are upper-hemi-
continuous and convexify these best responses through the standard approach (that
is to say, using versions of Shapley Folkman and Lyapunov’s theorem). We perform
this analysis in a very abstract framework that incorporates production economies,
incomplete financial markets and trading constraints. We show in the paper how
the model can incorporate indivisible commodities, segmented financial markets and
many other discrete choices.
We also consider a more concrete model with bankruptcy and default. This
model is not a special case of our general approach since in this case budget sets
depend on other agents’ choices through default and repayment-rates. For a long
time, modeling default and bankruptcy has been an important challenge for general
equilibrium models. Geanakoplos (1997) introduces collateral and default into general
equilibrium; Dubey et al. (2005) develop a two-period model with default decisions
and incomplete financial market. In both of these models default is modeled as a
continuous decision, the resulting economies are convex and can be analyzed with
standard models. Chatterjee et al. (2001) consider Bewley-style overlapping genera-
tions model with a continuum of agents and discrete bankruptcy decisions. In their
model the bond holding is chosen from a finite discrete set. We extend the litera-
ture by allowing for more complex bonds markets and durable goods. These durable
goods might be indivisible and they can be used as collateral for short positions in
the bonds. The punishment for default on certain bond will be the combination of
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losing certain amount of collateral and being excluded from certain bonds markets
for certain periods. With different punishment terms, different borrowing limit, we
have different bonds. As in Bewley (1984) a continuum of ex ante identical agents
faces uninsurable individual risks which are assumed to cancel out in the aggregate.
Agents then differ ex post by the realization of the idiosyncratic shocks and by the
choices they made. Since agents are finitely lived and there are finitely many possible
idiosyncratic shocks, at each date, there is a large, finite number of different agents.
Duffie et al. (1994) prove the existence of stationary equilibria in convex
economies. We employ their basic proof strategy to show existence of a generalized
Markov equilibrium in the presence of non-convexities. Halket (2014) considers a
Bewley style OLG model without aggregate uncertainty but with non-convex budget
sets that are somewhat similar to ours. He proves the existence of a steady state equi-
librium and provides a nice motivation for examining models with non-convexities.
In our setup, the presence of aggregate uncertainty implies that there is no steady
state equilibrium (in fact the existence of Markov equilibria typically requires very
strong conditions (see Brumm et al. (2017)). We also consider a special case of the
model without aggregate uncertainty. For this case we prove the existence of a steady
state equilibrium. The main difference between our proof and Halket’s work is that
he considers a model with several ’islands’ (which is more general than our setup) but
restricts attention to the case of indivisible commodities (that is less general than our
setup). Araujo and Pascoa (2002) prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a
two-period model with bankruptcy. Their model is more general than ours but it is
not obvious how any of these proofs extent to infinite dimensional models.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss a series of motivating
examples. In Section 3 we present an abstract model. In Section 4 we prove existence
of a generalized Markov equilibrium. In Section 5 we consider the special case of no
aggregate uncertainty and in Section 6 we prove existence of a steady state equilibrium
for this model.
Some examples
We first illustrate the three main issues with some simple examples.
Segmented markets and the need for many agents
Consider a simple Arrow-Debreu exchange economy with two types of agents,h =
1, 2, and two commodities, l = 1, 2. Suppose endowments are e1 = (1, 8) and
e2 = (7, 1) and utilities
U1(x1, x2) = x1 + x2, U2(x1, x2) = log x1 + log x2.
Suppose that markets are segmented in that agent 1 can only trade in good 1 unless
he pays a real cost of one unit of good 2 which allows him to enter the market for
good 2. There is no competitive equilibrium. If agent 1 does not enter the market,
prices are determined by agent 2 and p2 = 7, p1 = 1. At these prices agent 1 is willing
to enter the markets and pay a real cost of one unit of good. However, if agent 1
enters the market, prices are p1 = p2 = 1 and it is not worthwhile to give up one unit
of good 2 to be able to trade. Following Aumann (1964) and Starr(1969) the solution
is simply to assume that there is a continuum of agents of type 1 and a fraction of
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agents enters a market while the rest stays in autarky. The (extended) competitive
equilibrium is then as follows. Prices are p1 = 1, p2 = 1 + 17 , agents of type 1 are
indifferent between paying 1 unit of good 2, entering the market and buying 8 units
of good 1, and staying in autarky – in both cases utility is 9. The fraction of agents
entering the markets, ν, is determined by market clearing. The demand of agent 2
for good 1 is 4 + 1
14









Indivisible commodities and the need for an Inada condition
Suppose now the first commodity are houses and can only be consumed in
integer-amounts. Suppose agents of type 2 have endowments of one unit of this good
but there is only a measure 1/2 of such agents, while there is a measure 1 of agents
of type 1. Utility-functions and endowments are
U1(x1, x2) = 3x1 + x2, U2(x1, x2) = x1 + x2, e
1 = (0, 1), e2 = (1, 1)
There is no competitive equilibrium. If p2 < 1 agent 1 cannot buy a house because
his consumption in good 2 must be non-negative. Agent 2 wants to sell the house
and markets cannot clear. If p2 ≥ 1 all agents of type 1 want to buy a house, demand
jumps to 1 and there is no competitive equilibrium because total supply of housing
is only 1/2.
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Mas-Colell (1977) suggests to solve the problem by assuming that agents of
type 1 are not identical and there is a continuous distribution of agents. This turns
out to be technically challenging in our framework. Instead, we assume that agent 1’s
utility satisfies an Inada condition, i.e. U1(x1, x2) = 10x1 + v(x2) with limx→0 v′(x) =
∞. Normalize p1 = 1. At p2 = 1 the agent is not willing to sell all of good 2, because
marginal utility at zero is infinite. There is some p2 > 1 at which agent 1 is indifferent
between buying or not buying the house and a fraction 1/2 of agents buys the house.
All agents of type 2 sell the house and markets clear.
Intertemporal economies and heterogneity
Consider the previous example but assume that there are two time periods.
In the first period only the divisible good and a risk-free bond are traded. Utility
functions are
U1(x(0), x1(1), x2(1)) = log(x(0))+3x1(1)+log(x2(1)), U2(x1(1), x2(1)) = x1(1)+x2(1)
As before the mass of agents of type 1 is one and the mass of agents of type 2 is 1/2.
Endowments are e1(0) = 1, e11(1) = 0, e
1
2(1) = 1 and e
2(0) = 0, e21(1) = 1, e
2
1(2) = 1.
Clearly in spot markets in the second period 1/2 of agents of type 1 must buy the
house. In a rational expectations model, these agents already save for the house at
t=0, while the agents that do not buy the house borrow at t=0. The indivisibility in
the second period leads to the fact that ex ante identical agents already make different
choices in the first period. The competitive equilibrium is as follows. The price of
11
housing, p, the price of the first period bond, q, and bond demand of the agents that
buy a house, θ must satisfy





















) + log(1− qθ) = log(1− θ) + log(1 + qθ)
Solving the latter numerically, we obtain q ≃ 2.66553, θ ≃ 0.31242 and p = 1.2497.
The example illustrates that discrete decisions in the future can lead ex ante
identical agents to make very different decisions in the current period. In order to
convexify an agents’ best response correspondence we therefore have to consider all
the decisions she makes over her life-cycle.
The model
We first derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a competitive equilib-
rium in an abstract framework. In Section 5 below we will consider a slight variation
of this model without aggregate uncertainty that incorporates default and we prove
the existence of a steady-state equilibrium for this case.
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An abstract intertemporal economy
We consider a stochastic overlapping generations economy with a continuum
of ex ante identical agents. Time is indexed by t ∈ N0. Exogenous shocks zt realize in
a finite set Z. A history of shocks up to some date t is denoted by zt = (z0, z1, . . . , zt)
and called a date event.
At each date event a continuum of ex ante identical agents of mass one enters
the economy, each agent lives for A periods, and agents differ ex post by their choices.
At each zt agents trade in L commodities and assets. The intertemporal budget
correspondence of an agent is indexed by i ∈ I = {1, ..., I}, a finite set of indices.
The intertemporal budget set of an agent depends on i ∈ I, the agent’s age, a, her
choices in commodities and assets in the last period, x− ∈L. Define the budget
correspondence Ba,i(x−, p, z),
Ba,i :





as well as the opportunity correspondence
Oa : I×
L ×Z ⇒ I,
where I denotes the set of all subsets of I. An agent of age a who is in budget i in
the current period and who chooses x can decide to move to another budget i′ in the
subsequent period in shock z′ if i′ ∈ Oa+1(i, x, z′).
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At birth all agents at node zt are ex ante identical and each one maximizes
utility subject to the budget set, i.e. he chooses budget-sets, consumptions and asset-
holdings for all histories of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks over his life-cycle.
It will be useful to define K =
∑A−1
a=0 Z
a to denote the total number of aggregate
date events relevant to the agent, and to use the notation ~x ∈KL,~i ∈ IK to denote
consumption, asset holdings and budget-choices over the life cycle. If associated with
a specific agent who was born at node zt, elements of ~xzt (and ~i analogously) are
denoted by xzt(zt+a), otherwise we associate them with the nodes z0, . . . , (zA−1).
An agent has a utility function over life-cycle consumption that can depend
on the shock at birth and that is denoted by Uzt : C ⊂
kL→, where C is a closed and
convex set. At this point no assumptions are made about time- or state-separability
of utility. Special cases obviously include time-separable expected utility, recursive
utility, and utility models with habit formation.








for all zt+a−1  zt, a = 1, . . . , A
where xzt(zt−1) = 0.
Aggregate resources at each zt are assumed to depend on the shock and on
last period’s aggregate choices and they denoted by ω(zt, x(zt−1)) ∈L+. At t = 0 there
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are initially alive agents of ages a = 2, ..., A, who are in some initial budget iyA−1(z0)
and who have some initial choices xz−a(z−1) ≥ 0. They have utility functions uz−a
that are defined only over remaining consumption in their lifetimes.
Their utility maximization problems are straightforward modifications of (1.1).
Equilibrium
Since budget correspondences are non-convex we need to work with the concept
of extended sequential equilibrium, where ex ante identical agents possibly make
different choices. We focus on equilibria where there are only finitely many different
choices made by each type of agent and where choices can be indexed by some j ∈
J = {1, . . . , J}.
We are now in a position to define a sequential competitive equilibrium.
Definition 1 A sequential competitive equilibrium consists of prices p(zt) for all
zt, t ∈ N,, fractions of agents, (νzt(j))j=1,...,J ,
∑
j∈J νzt(j) = 1 for all z
t, as well
consumption and asset holdings (~xzt,j) and budget choices (~izt,j) for all j with νzt(j) >
0 and for all zt such that
1. Each agent maximizes utility, i.e. for all zt and j ∈ J, if νzt(j) > 0 then
(~xzt,j,~izt,j), solves (1).
The maximization problem of the initially alive is analogous.




















Existence of a competitive equilibrium
We follow the construction from Duffie et al. (1994) to show that there exists
a sequential competitive equilibrium for which all endogenous variables, jointly with
the aggregate shock, follow a Markov process.
Assumptions
Let
∆Kǫ = {~p ∈
LK
+ : For all z
t, t = 0, . . . , A−1, p(zt) ∈ ∆, pl(z
t) ≥ ǫ for all l = 1, . . . , L}.
Analogous to our definitions of ~x and ~i, we define ~p ∈ ∆Kǫ as a sequence of state-
contingent prices over an agent’s life-cycle. For sufficiently small ǫ > 0 and any
~p ∈ ∆kǫ the budget set of an agent born at shock z0 ∈ Z who chooses~i can be written
as
~Bz0,~i(~p) = {~x ∈
KL: x(zt) ∈ Ba,~i(za)(x(z
t−1), p(zt)), i(zt)
∈ Oa(i(z
t−1, x(zt−1), zt), for all zt, t = 0, . . . , A− 1}.
We define the set of prices for which the choice ~i is admissible as
~Pz,~i = {~p ∈ ∆
k
ǫ : Bz~i(~p) is non-empty}.
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Throughout we think of the vector x as choices in consumption and assets.
To state the assumptions we need for existence it is useful to think of the first G,
1 ≤ G ≤ L elements of x to denote choices in commodities.
The following assumptions are made on fundamentals.
Assumption 1
1. For each z the utility function, Uz : C → is continuous.
2. For each a = 2, . . . , A, z ∈ Z, the function ωa(z, x) is continuous in x and
ω1(z, x) does not depend on x.
3. There is a U = x > 0 such that for each a = 1, . . . , A,, for all z ∈ Z and
all x ∈ C,
x ≥ ωal(z, x) ≥ 0, l = 1, . . . , G
While Assumption 1.1 is very weak and standard, Assumption 1.2 is rather strong.
However, this should be viewed as a reduced-form assumption that ensures that in
equilibrium aggregate consumption is bounded above.
The following assumptions are made on budget-correspondences.
Assumption 2
1. For each ~i and z, if ~Pz,~i is non-empty then it is a closed set and
~Bz,~i(.) is
continuous on ~Pz,~i.
2. For all ǫ > 0, for any z there is a ~i∗ such that ~Pz,~i∗ = ∆
K
ǫ .
3. For all ~i, z and all ~p ∈ ∆Kǫ , if ~x ∈
~Bz0,~i(~p) then xl(z
t) ≥ 0 for all l =
1, . . . , G, and all zt, t = 0, . . . , A− 1.
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Assumption 2.1 ensures that after the choice of a given (feasible) budget,
the budget correspondence is well behaved. Assumption 2.2 ensures that an agent
can always choose a budget set that is feasible under all prices. Assumption 2.3
ensures that there are consumption goods that have to be consumed in non-negative
quantities.
We make the following joint assumptions on utilities and the budget corre-
spondene
Assumption 3
1. For each z there exists an ǫ > 0 such that if ~pi < ǫ and (~x, ~y) solves (1.1)
for some i then xl(z
t) > (A + 1)x for some l = 1, . . . , G and some zt,
t = 0, . . . , A− 1.




Uz(~x) s.t. x ∈ ~Bz~i(~p) < max
~x,~j∈~I
Uz(~x) s.t. x ∈ ~Bz~j(~p)
3. If (~x,~i) solves (1.1) then
p(zt) · x(zt) = p(zt)ωt+1(zt, x(z
t−1)) for all zt, t = 0, . . . , A− 1
Existence of competitive equilibrium
Define ~p(zt) = (p(zt+τ ))zt+τzt,τ=0,...,A−1 as the collection of current prices and
all possible (state-contigent) prices over the next A − 1 periods. We define all en-
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In order to prove existence of a generalized Markov equilibria it is useful to
change notation a bit and denote consumption of an agent of age a whose choices are
indexed by j as xa,j and to denote the measure of choices j within agents of age a as










We define Ξz as the set of all ξ that are consistent with market clearing at a given
shock z ∈ Z. We have












νa(~i)xa,~i(z−a+1, . . . , z−1)
For each shock z ∈ Z we define the expectations correspondence,




Gz̄(ξ̄) = {(ξ1, . . . , ξz) ∈ Ξ1 × . . .×ΞZ :
~p = ~S(p, ~p1, . . . , ~pZ)
(~x1,j,~i) solves (1.1) if ν1(j) > 0
xa+1,~i,z = xa,~i for all a = 1, . . . A− 1, j ∈ J, z ∈ Z
νa+1,z(.) = νa for all a = 1, . . . , A = 1, z ∈ Z}
where
~S(p, ~p1, . . . , ~pZ) = (p, (p1(z
a))a=0,...A−2, . . . , (pZ(z
a))a=1,...,A−2).
We have the following existence result.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1.1-1.3 there exists a compact sets Ξ∗ ⊂ Ξ such
that for all ξ(0) ∈ Ξ∗ there are ξ(z) ∈ Ξ∗, z = 1, . . . , Z such that
(ξ(1), . . . , ξ(Z)) ∈ G(ξ(0)).
It is easy to see that the proposition, together with our definition of the expectations
correspondence implies the existence of a competitive equilibrium.
To prove the proposition we follow Duffie et al. (1994) and construct the set
Ξ∗ by backward induction. Given a compact Ξ, define a backward operator , E(.) on
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K ⊂ Ξ as follows
E1(K) = {ξ ∈ Ξ : ∃(ξ(1), . . . , ξ(Z)) ∈ KZ ∩G(ξ)}.
For n = 2, 3, . . . , let En(K) = E (En−1(K)).
We use the following lemma whose proof is standard (see e.g. Duffie et al
(1996) or Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) for similar results in slightly different
environments).
Lemma 1 Suppose there is some compact Ξ such that for each n, En(Ξ) is non-empty
and closed. Then the statement of Proposition 1 holds.
By the definition of G it is clear that each En is closed. In order to establish
non-emptiness, we establish existence of equilibrium for a truncated economy. For
any T = 2, . . . take a T -truncated economy to be a T period economy that is identical
with respect to asset payoffs, endowments and utility to the original economy at all
nodes for the first T − A periods. For the last A − 1 periods the utility functions
of have to be modified to take into account the fact that there are no longer defined
over a life-cycle of length A. Details on how to do this are largely irrelevant as long
as the modified utility function is well defined (and continuous). We will prove that
in this economy a sequential equilibrium always exists and that we can bound all
endogenous variables uniformly across T .
This gives the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 There is a compact set Ξ ⊂ Ξ such that for any T , there exists a sequential
equilibrium for the T -truncated economy with ξ(zt) ∈ Ξ for all zt, t ≤ T .
To prove this lemma we need Caratheodory’s theorem. For a set A let conv(A)
be its convex hull, i.e. the smallest convex set containing A.
Lemma 3 Let A ⊂n and x ∈ conv(A). Then there are z1, ..., zn+1 ∈ A such that
x =
∑n+1
i=1 αizi for some α ∈ ∆
n
Proof of Lemma 2. Given ǫ > 0, Assumptions 1-3 guarantee that each
zt’s best response correspondence in upper-hemi-continous on ∆Kǫ . Let Φzt(~p; z
t+a)
denote the convex hull of this correspondence projected to zt+a. At each zt a price
















A standard argument gives the existence of a fixed point. For sufficiently small ǫ,
Assumption 2 implies that the price player in fact maximizes over all ∆. Assumption
3 then implies that market clearing must hold at the fixed point. Lemma 3 implies
that for each agent zt there exist KL + 1 different choices j = 1, . . . , KL + 1 and








Finally Assumption 1-3 imply that all endogenous variables are bounded uniformly
in T .
Stationary equilibrium
It is a natural question to ask if there exist Markov equilibria if one makes
stronger assumptions on preferences (in particular if one assumes time-separable ex-
pected utility) and budget-sets. As Kubler and Polemarchakis (2004) explain, the
assumption of rational expectations implies that in the presence of multiple equilib-
ria in spot markets, the past plays a crucial rule in selecting the equilibrium that
is consistent with agents’ expectations. Brumm et al. (2017) prove the existence of
a Markov equilibria in a model with finitely many agents – it seems impossible to
extend their proof to this framework. It would seem that our assumption that agents
are ex ante identical which guarantees that ex post there are finitely many agents in
the economy might make it easier to prove existence of a Markov equilibrium. How-
ever, as our example in Section 2 above illustrates, the fractions of agents making
different choices is determined by all prices over the agent’s life-cycle and not just by
current prices. If one assumes that utility is concave one can index an agent by his
life-cycle budget choice ~i. This potentially decreases the number of possible choices
substantially. However, it is not clear how it helps to establish existence of a simple
Markov equilibrium.
As we will see now, it is possible to establish the existence of a steady state
equilibrium in a Bewley-style model without aggregate uncertainty.
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No aggregate uncertainty and steady states
We provide a Bewley-style model with heterogeneous agents and only idiosyn-
cratic endowment shocks. The financial market consists of several bonds that differ
on the punishments of default. This special case can be seen as an application on the
agents’ housing decisions and default decisions. We briefly rewrite the notations to
avoid confusion.
The Model
We set up an exchange economy from a Bewley-style model with heterogeneous
agents and idiosyncratic endowment shocks. Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ N+.
There are H types of heterogeneous agents with an overlapping-generation structure.
For each type of agent, new agents are born with age 1 and will live for A periods.
Agents face idiosyncratic endowment shocks and choose consumption among M per-
ishable commodities, N durable commoditie and holdings of J bonds. H,M,N, J,A ∈
N++ are finite. There is a continuum of agents distributed on the interval [0, AH] ac-
cording to the Lebesgue measure λ. Denote H = {1, 2, ..., H},A = {1, 2, ..., A}, and
denote the measure of age a type h agents as λah . At every period of time, a measure
1 of each type h ∈ H is born with age 0, which makes λah = 1, ∀a ∈ A, h ∈ H. An
agent can be identified by (a, h, k), where a ∈ A, h ∈ H, k ∈ [0, 1].
For each agent (a, h, k), the exogenous shock {y(a,h,k)t }t≥0 follows an ergodic
Markov process with finite states y(a,h,k)t ∈ Y,Y = {1, 2, ..., Y }, with transition func-
tion Q : Y × 2Y → [0, 1]. Since it is an ergodic process, it converges to a stationary
distribution P : 2Y → [0, 1]. We take the Feldman and Gills (1985) construction
24
among agents, so that the empirical distribution equals the limit distribution. That
is, for S = {k : y(a,h,k) = s} we have λah(S) = P (s) for all a, h.
We assume the perishable commodities(consumption goods) are continuously
valued and the durable commodities are discrete valued. It is trivial to also include
discrete valued perishable commodities and continuous valued durable commodities
into the model, yet our set up catches the essence of the underling problem and
simplifies notations. The durable commodities’ supplies are exogenous given as φ̄.
Agents are born with no durable commodities. And agents have endowments of
consumption goods each period depending on the endowment shocks e : A×H×Y →
R++. And we denote e(a, h, y) as eah(y) for short.
There are J one period bonds in the market traded every period. Without lose
of generality, we assume one share of bond promises to pay one unit of consumption
good m1 on the next period. The bonds are traded at price q ∈ RJ+ and the returns
are collected the next period. The return vector on the bonds is denoted as r ∈ RJ+.
The net supplies of bonds are 0.
We incorporate two types of discrete decisions an agent can make that induce
non-convexities. The first is that the durable commodities take integer values only;
the second is the decision to default on certain bonds. For the first kind of discrete
decisions, perishable commodities M are continuous valued and durable commodities
N are discrete valued. We denote an agent’s consumption or holding of commodities
as x ∈ RM+ , φ ∈ N
N
+ . All the bonds take continuous values, θ ∈ R
J . Correspondingly,
we have the price vectors: p ∈ RM+ , π ∈ R
N
+ , q ∈ R
J
+. For the other type of dis-
crete decisions, we need to address the punishment of default. We assume that the
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punishments are combinations of two forms: to take away durable goods, and (or)
to restrict the agent’s participation in the financial market. We use the opportunity
correspondence to describe this.
We define the opportunity correspondence as O : I ⇒ I, I = {1, 2, ..., i, ...}
is a countable set and I denotes the set of all I’s subsets. For each i ∈ I there are
several sets and functions to define: φi ∈ N+ is the decision on holdings of the durable
commodities; θi ∈ R which is the borrowing constraint on the bonds; for each bond
j, δij : NN+ → N
N
+ is the change function of the durable goods holding φ
−, and we
have ̺ji : R → R is the portfolio holding after change of θ−j .
Assumption 4 For all i, φi ≥ 0. θi are bounded below as θi ≥ θ. For each discrete
choice φ, the subset Iφ = {i ∈ I : φi = φ} is non-empty and finite.
Assumption 5 ̺ is continuous, ̺j(0) = 0, ̺j(θj) = θj if θj > 0, ̺(θj) ≥ θj if θj < 0
for all j ∈ J;
∑
j δj(φ) ≤ φ.
The assumption on ̺ states that the shares of the lenders will not change, and the
shares of the borrowers may change due to default. The assumption on φ states that
the punishment of taking away one’s durable goods cannot take more durable goods
than the amount one owns.
Then we define the budgets sets B(a, h, θ−, i−, i, y, p, π, q, r) as follows:
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B(a, h, θ−, i−, i, y, p, π, q, r) :
={(x, φ, θ) : φ = φi,




π · δij(φi−) +
∑
j
p1̺ji([1− 1θ−j >0(1− rj)]θ
−
j ) + p · eah(y)}
For the new born agents a = 0, of type h, we set θ−1 = 0, φ
−
1 = 0, i
− = h.
Assumption 6 For all i− ∈ I, there exists i0 ∈ O(i
−) such that B(a, h, i−, i0, y) =
{(x, φ, θ) : φ = 0, θ = 0, px ≤ peah(y)}
This assumption allows any agent to default on every bond and consume the endow-
ments only.
Utility functions
The utility function for agents with (a, h) is defined as uah : RM+ × N
N
+ → R.
Assumption 7 For all a ∈ A, h ∈ H,
i). Given φ ∈ NN+ , the utility function uah(·, φ) is strictly increasing and
concave, continuous, and twice differentiable. There is a consumption commodity m1
such that limm1→0um1(·, φ) = +∞, uah(m1 = 0, ·, φ) = −∞, and uah(m1, ·, φ) > −∞
for m1 > 0.
ii). Given x ∈ RM+ , the utility function uah(x, ·) is strictly increasing.
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This Inada condition on one consumption good plays an important role on
getting an upper-hemi continuous optimal policy. The agent would not “jump” to a
new budget set once she could afford it because that implies the zero consumption
on m1 and thus infinite negative utility.
Besides the punishments on default, we introduce a cost of default l : I → R+












0 if ̺i(θ) = θ
l0 > 0 else
This cost term represents the aggregate effect of time and effort spent on the default
procedure, and can be arbitrarily small. It is crucial to have this term when the
punishments on default is too “mild” that agents would always default regardless of
the bond price. This will be further illustrated in the next section.
We define the value function in the recursive form as follows




uah(x, φi−)− l(i) + β
∑
y′
V (a+ 1, h, θ, i)Q(y, y′)
}
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with the terminal value defined as V (A− 1, ·) = 0. The policy correspondence
is




uah(x, φi−)− l(i) + β
∑
y′
V (a+ 1, h, θ, i)Q(y, y′)
}
The equilibrium
For each agent (a, h, k), there is a vector (a, h, θ−, i−, y, x, θ, i) as defined before.
Define a distribution µ as
µ(X) = λ({(a, h, k) : (a, h, θ−, i−, y, x, θ, i)a,h,k ∈ X})
The equilibrium E consists of stationary prices p∗, π∗, q∗, returns of bonds r∗ decision
rules (x∗, φ∗, θ∗, i∗)a,h,k, a ∈ A, h ∈ H, k ∈ [0, 1] and a distribution µ∗ such that:





















∗ for all j;
(v) µ∗ is invariant.




(h) ≡ {(τ1, τ2) : τ1 ∈ G
ya−1(h), yA−1 ≻ ya−1; τ2 ∈ G(θa−1, ia−1, ya),
(θa−1, φa−1) = (θa−1(τ1), φa−1(τ1))}, G
y0(h) = G(a = 1, h, θ− = 0, φ− = 0, i− = h, y0).
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So for one type h agent, the total demand over her life cycle with shocks yA−1
can be defined as






















̺ia(τ)(1θa−1(τ)≥0θa−1(τ)), , τ ∈ G
yA−1(h)}
Since we have continuum of agents, the total demand of agent h with shocks yA−1 is
the convex hull of d(h, yA−1).
Given shocks y converges to a stationary distribution, the total demand of type
h agent(with measure A) in equilibrium is equivalent to the expected total demand
over her life cycle.
Then the total demand of type h agents in the economy can be defined as
D(h) = {τ(h) : τ(h) =
∑
yA−1
τ(h, yA−1)P(yA−1), τ(h, yA−1) ∈ Cov(d(h, yA−1))}
So the original equilibrium is equivalent to the following:

























































Existence of a steady state equilibrium
We prove the existence of a refined equilibrium in the sense of Dubey, Geanakopo-
los and Shubik (2005).
Trembling refined equilibrium
First we define a trembling equilibrium. We introduce a measure of A external
ε-agents who sell and buy ε = (εj)j∈J ≫ 0 every period and pay back debt fully every
period. The transactions are financed by fixed endowment of (1−r)ε
p1
each period in
continuous consumption good m1.
So we define the ε-boosted equilibrium E(ε) as follows:
The equilibrium E(ε) consists of stationary prices p∗(ε), q∗(ε), returns r∗(ε) ,

















































Existence of ε-boosted Fixed Point
First, for any small lower bound ǫ > 0, define
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q = 1, andmin{p, π, q} ≥ ǫ}
The lower bound ǫ on prices, along with lower bound of asset holding, put
upper bounds of consumptions, durable goods holdings and asset holdings, and indi-
rectly on returns r. Denote the maximum of those upper bounds as Mǫ. Denote Iǫ
as the finite subset of I bounded by Mǫ.
We detour from the procedure of proving ε-boosted equilibrium. This is due
to the fact that the limit point when ǫ → 0 of the fixed point is not necessarily a
ε-boosted equilibrium. Nonetheless, when ǫ → 0, ε → 0, we can show that the limit
point is actually the original equilibrium. So instead, we set ε = ǫ, and show that the
limit fixed point is the original equilibrium.
The modified budget set
We define B̂ as modified (non-empty, compact, and continuous) budget set.
Let the modified budget set be
B̂(a, h, θ−, i−, i, y, p, π, q, r) = B(a, h, θ−, i−, i, y, p, π, q, r) ∪ {(0, 0, θi)}
Lemma 4 B̂(a, h, θ−, i−, i, y, p, π, q, r) is non-empty, compact, and continuous
in θ−, p, π, q, r.
Proof: First, B̂(i−, i) is non-empty and compact by construction.
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Second, for (p, π, q) ∈ ∆ǫ, B(a, h, θ−, i−, i, y, p, π, q, r) and {(0, 0, θi)} are both
continuous. So the union is also continuous.
The total demand of type h agents
The value function




u(x, φ−) + β
∑
y′
V̂ (a+ 1, h, θ, i, p, π, q, r, y′)Q(y, y′)
}
The policy correspondence is




u(x, φ−) + β
∑
y′
V̂ (a+ 1, h, θ, i, p, π, q, r, y′)Q(y, y′)
}
Lemma 5 Ĝ is u.h.c. in (θ−, i−, p, π, q, r).
Proof: Using Theorem 2 in the Appendix, we have the policy correspondence
Ĝ is u.h.c. Theorem 2 assumes infinitely-living agent, but the results easily apply to




Lemma 6 Given ∆ǫ, D̂(h) is compact, convex-valued, and u.h.c. in (p, π, q, r).
Proof: First, we show that Ĝy
A−1
(h) is u.h.c. in (p, π, q, r).
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By Lemma, we have Ĝy
0
(h) is u.h.c. in (p, π, q, r). So for (pn, πn, qn, rn) →
(p, π, q, r), and (xn, φn, θn, in) ∈ Ĝy
0
(h, pn, πn, qn, rn), if (xn, φn, θn, in) → (x, φ, θ, i),
then (x, φ, θ, i) ∈ Ĝy
0
(h, p, π, q, r).
For Ĝy
1
(h), (pn, πn, qn, rn) → (p, π, q, r), and ((x1n, φ1n, θ1n, i1n), (x2n, φ2n, θ2n,
i2n)) ∈ Ĝ
y1(h, pn, πn, πn, qn, rn), if ((x1n, φ1n, θ1n, i1n), (x2n, φ2n, θ2n, i2n)) → ((x1, φ1, θ1,
i1), (x2, φ2, θ2, i2)), we know from above that (x1, φ1, θ1, i1) ∈ Ĝy
0
(h, p, π, q, r). We just
need to show that (x2, φ2, θ2, i2) ∈ G(φ1, θ1, i1, p, π, q, r, y1). Use the formal Lemma
again, we have Ĝy
1
(h) is u.h.c. in (p, π, q, r). By induction, we can get Ĝy
A−1
(h) is
u.h.c. in (p, π, q, r).
By construction, we get d(h, yA−1) is u.h.c. in (p, π, q, r). And further, D̂(h)
is compact, convex-valued, and u.h.c. in (p, π, q, r). 
Lemma 7 Given assumption 5, 6, for (p, π, q) ∈ ∆ǫ, V̂ = V, Ĝ = G.
Proof: Given assumption 5, 6, (0, 0, θi) is never an optimal choice. So the
agents choose from the true budget set. Thus, V̂ = V, Ĝ = G. 
So we have for any (x̄h, θ̄h, δh̺h(+), ̺h(−)) ∈ D̂b(h), the following inequality
holds.
px̄h + qθ̄h ≤ −πδh + p1r̺h(+)− p1̺h(−) + peh (1.2)
The fixed point






h p1̺j(−) + p1ǫ
∑
h p1̺j(+) + p1ǫ
(1.3)
0 ≤ rj ≤Mǫ for all j.
The demand correspondences are
Φhǫ = D̂(h, p, π, q, r)
Define the price player as





(x− e) + π(
∑
h




By Kakutani’s Theorem the correspondence rǫ ×Hh=0 Φ
h
ǫ has a fixed point ηǫ.










(1− rj)ǫ ≤ 0 (1.4)
With increasing utility, the equality holds at the fixed point.
Lemma 8 When ǫ → 0, p(ηǫ), π(ηǫ), q(ηǫ), r(ηǫ) are bounded away from 0, r(ηǫ) is
bounded above.
Proof: First, we show that p, π are bounded away from 0. Denote p = min{p, π},
p̂ = max{p}, and p̄ = max{p, π, q}. We prove by contradiction: assume when ǫ→ 0,
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p → 0. Then if p̂ 6→ 0, the consumption of the good with price p will go to infinity.
This contradicts with the price player’s best response. If p̂ → 0, then p → 0. It is
easy to check that this cannot be at a fixed point. So p, π are bounded away from 0.
Next, we show that q, r are bounded away from 0 and r is bounded above. We
prove by contradiction. If rj → +∞, then ̺h,j(+) ≥ 0 for all h, which in turn implies
by (3) that rj ≤ 1. Contradiction.
If qj → 0, then due to the positive cost of default. There exists an qj that if
qj ≤ qj, ̺h,j(−) = 0 for all h. Also ̺h,j(+) > 0, otherwise rj → 1 and it contradicts
with agent’s utility maximization. So
∑
h θj > 0 and it contradicts the price player’s
maximization problem.
If rj → 0, There exists an rj that if rj ≤ rj, ̺h,j(+) = 0 for all h. This implies
by (3) that rj ≥ 0. Contradiction. 
It is crucial to have Assumption 8 for Lemma 8. If there is no cost of default, it
is possible to have a zero-price, zero-return bond in the limit point. This may happen
when the punishments are too “mild” and every one that borrows would default.
Existence of equilibrium
From Lemma 8, there exists a subsequence of η(ǫ) that converges to η∗ when
ǫ→ 0. Next we show η∗ is an equilibrium.
Theorem 1 Given Assumptions 4-8,there exists an equilibrium defined in section
5.3.
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(x− e) + q
∑
h
θ ≤ 0 (1.5)




(x− e) + q ∗
∑
h























(x− e) + π(
∑
h



























(x− e) ≥ 0, (
∑
φ− C) ≥ 0,
∑




θ = 0. This further implies (
∑
φ−C) = 0. Because if (
∑
φ−C) > 0,
by setting price to π+∆, p−∆, the price player is better off, which contradicts that
the price player optimizes at the fixed point.
Also easy to see, when ǫ = 0, the agents optimize on the true budget sets. So
there exists an equilibrium. 
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Appendix
Similarly to Stockey & Lucas (1989),
Assumption 9.4 X is a convex Borel set in Rl, with its Borel subsets X .
Assumption 9.5 One of the following conditions holds:
a. Z is a countable set and Z is the σ-algebra containing all subsets of Z;
b. Z is a compact (Borel) set in Rk, with its Borel subsets Z, and the transition
function Q on (Z,Z) has the Feller property.
Assumption 9.6 The correspondence Γ : X×Z → X is nonempty, compact-
valued, and continuous.
Assumption 9.7 The function F : A → R is bounded and continuous, and
β ∈ (0, 1).
Assumption 9.6’ For all i ∈ I, i′ ∈ I(i), the correspondence Γi,i′ : X×Z → X
is nonempty, compact-valued, and continuous.
Theorem 2 Let (X,X ), (Z,Z), Q,Γ, F, β, and I satisfy Assumptions 9.4,9.5,9.6’,9.7,
and define the operator T on C(S) by
(Tf)(x, z, i) = sup
i′∈I(i),y∈Γi,i′ (x.z)
{
F (x, y, z) + β
∫
f(y, z′, i′)Q(z, dz′)
}
We use discrete metric on I, all functions are continuous on I.
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Then T : C(S) → C(S); T has a unique fixed point v in C(S) and for any
v0 ∈ C(S),
‖T nv0 − v‖ ≤ β
n‖v0 − v‖, n = 1, 2, ....




(i′, y)) : i′ ∈ I(i), y ∈ Γi,i′(x, z), v(x, z, i) = F (x, y, z) + β
∫
v(y, z′, i′)Q(y, dz′)
}
,
is nonempty, compact-valued, and u.h.c.
Proof: It is easy to see that
(Tf)(x, z, i) = sup
i′∈I(i),y∈Γi,i′ (x.z)
{
F (x, y, z) + β
∫







F (x, y, z) + β
∫





From Lemma 9.5, we have (Ti′f)(x, z, i) are bounded and continuous. Since I
is a finite set, (Tf)(x, z, i) ∈ C(S). So we have T : C(S) → C(S).
Immediately we can see that T satisfies Blackwell’s sufficient conditions. So T
has a unique fixed point and the equation ‖T nv0 − v‖ ≤ βn‖v0 − v‖ holds.
Then G(x, z, i) is u.h.c based on similar argument as the theorem of Maximum.
Define f(x, z, i, y, i′) := F (x, y, z)+β
∫
v(y, z′, i′)Q(y, dz′). Let (xn, zn, in) → (x, z, i),
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for large enough n,in = i. Let Γi = ∪i′∈I(i)Γi,i′ , with discrete metric on i′, Γi is
continuous.
Choose (i′n, yn) ∈ G(xn, zn, i). Since Γi is u.h.c., there exists a subsequence
{i′nk , ynk} converging to (i
′, y) ∈ Γi(x, z). Also since Γi is l.h.c., for all (i′l, yl) ∈
Γi(x, z), there exists {i′lnk , ylnk} → (i
′
l, yl), with {i
′
lnk
, ylnk} ∈ Γi(xnk , znk). Since
f(xnk , znk , i, i
′
nk
, ynk) ≥ f(xnk , znk , i, i
′
lnk
, ylnk) and f is continuous. So f(x, z, i, i
′, y) ≥
f(x, z, i, i′l, yl), with leads to (i
′, y) ∈ G(x, y, i).
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Chapter 2
Recursive equilibria in dynamic economies with bounded rationality
This paper provides a general way of modeling bounded rationality in the dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium framework with infinitely lived heterogeneous agents
and incomplete markets. Different from a rational agent, a bounded rational agent
is associated with an extra parameter ǫ, which can be interpreted as the “level of
irrationality”. The bounded rational agent does not know the true probability dis-
tribution of the economy fundamentals. To make decisions, the bounded rational
agent forms a belief of a stationary distribution of the fundamentals and then use the
Markov transition associated with it to maximize utility. If a distribution of the fun-
damentals stays “closer” to its next-period transition than ǫ, the agent would consider
it as ǫ-stationary. In equilibrium, each agent maximizes utility with an ǫ-stationary
belief and markets clear. The main theorem of this paper shows that for any strictly
positive ǫ, a recursive equilibrium exists. This result provides a potential way of mea-
suring the “level of irrationality” for many behavioral models. Besides, there are two
applications for a special case of the model, when ǫ is extremely close to zero: It lays
foundation for numerically computed equilibria of models with the rational expecta-
tion assumption; and it can be viewed as an epsilon-equilibrium existence result for




Since it is first proposed by Simon (1955), bounded rationality has been ex-
tensively studied in the literature of economics and finance, especially behavioral and
experimental economics. The idea that agents are limited by the tractability of the de-
cision problem and the cognitive limitations of their minds to make optimal decisions
should not be seen as a compromise for tractable models with the rational expecta-
tion assumption, but a more realistic way of modeling human behavior. Indeed, if
the collective knowledge of human kind cannot solve a model, it is rather harsh to
assume that each and every agent in the model can solve it perfectly. Experimen-
tal economists has shown that agents behavior deviates from the theoretical optimal
systematically in so many aspects, that dynamic stochastic models with bounded ra-
tionality are getting more and more popular than their alternatives with the rational
expectation assumption. Despite that there are many convincing findings in the lit-
erature of behavioral economics and experimental economics showing that agents are
bounded rational, there is not yet a consistent theory to explain these findings. This
paper tries to provide a general way to model bounded rationality in the framework
of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with infinitely lived heterogeneous
agents and incomplete financial markets.
Different kinds of heuristics the agents use not only have been found in exper-
iments but also have been used in macro models, such as Krusell and Smith (1998),
Gabaix (2014). The fact that many of these heuristics are seemingly independent of
each other makes it challenging to find a general model. Dixon (2001) made an at-
44
tempt to unify different kinds of bounded rationality: If the bounded rational agents’
choices get them “close" to the optimum, then we can use the notion of ǫ-optimization,
which means agents make choices so that the payoff is within ǫ of the optimum. De-
fine the optimum (best possible) payoff as U∗, then the set of ǫ-optimizing choices
C(ǫ) can be defined as all those choices c such that: U(c) ≥ U∗ − ǫ. The notion
of strict rationality is then a special case (ǫ = 0). Difficulties emerge if we try to
incorporate this idea into dynamic general equilibrium models. On the one hand,
we do not know the “true” optimum in a general equilibrium model since the utility
level achieved with strict rationality is not necessarily the optimum any more. This
is consistent with the idea of Gigerenzer and Reinhard (2002) that simple heuristics
may lead to better decisions than theoretically optimal under strict rationality. On
the other hand, if the agents know the optimum choices, it makes less sense that
they deliberately choose those actions that are sub-optimal. And hence there is no
satisfactory way to interpret the meaning of ǫ.
When it comes to stochastic models and agents make choices under uncer-
tainty, there can be an alternative way to incorporate Dixon’s (2001) idea. Instead of
ǫ-optimization, we argue that the rational expectation assumption should be relaxed
and agents optimize with an “ǫ-belief” of the equilibrium distribution of the economic
fundamentals. Given the “ǫ-belief”, the agent would forecast future fundamentals
using the Bayes’ rule and then make optimal choices consistent with the forecasts.
This way of modeling bounded rationality embodies three philosophical considera-
tions besides its practical virtues. First, the “modelees” behave the same way as the
“modeler”. Since economic modeling itself is usually forming a belief about how the
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economy evolves and make (sometimes terrible) predictions on future economic vari-
ables, it is natural to assume the agents in the model behave with this procedure
as well. Second, it captures the notion that a small mistake may cause a large loss.
Compared to Dixon (2001), an “ǫ-belief” does not necessarily mean an ǫ loss of the
total utility. A small misperception may cause a large loss. This is analogous to Ak-
erlof and Yellen (1985), where small deviations from rational choices make significant
differences to utility functions. Third, it conveys the idea that rational agents are
all alike; every bounded rational agent is bounded rational in its own way. The error
term ǫ may differ among agents. And even with the same ǫ, there are different kinds
of incorrect beliefs. So the agents choices (policy functions) may still be different.
This is consistent with the fact that many different kinds of heuristics are found in
experiments.
Although we now have a more natural and general idea to model bounded
rationality, how to define the “ǫ-belief” remains a challenge. In a static partial equi-
librium model, if we assume there is a true distribution µ∗ exogenously given, it is easy
to find the “ǫ-belief” once we have a metric ‖ · ‖ on the space of probability measures.
An “ǫ-belief” then can be defined as a probability measure µ such that ‖µ− µ∗‖ ≤ ǫ.
But in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model instead, the task is way more
difficult in two aspects. First, with standard assumptions, a recursive equilibrium
does not exist generically.1 So we may not be able to find such µ∗. Even if we assume
recursive equilibrium always exists, the equilibrium distribution of the fundamentals
1. See Hellwig (1983), Kubler and Schmedders (2002), Santos (2002), Kubler and Polemar-
chakis (2004).
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changes if any agent’s belief changed—i.e. the equilibrium distribution µ∗ depends
on µ and has to be determined simultaneously with µ. Second, in dynamic stochastic
models, agents need not only the information of the current period but also forecasts
of economic variables in future periods to make decisions. So we need µ to be a dis-
tribution over an adequate state space so that the agent can compute the distribution
over the same state space of the next time period µ′ conditional on µ.
The second difficulty can be dealt with by using the state space introduced by
Duffie et al. (1994) when considering an exchange economy with incomplete financial
market. The state space consists of the exogenous shock, the initial asset holdings
of agents, the prices, and the end-of-period asset holdings. This is an extension of
the natural state space in the sense of Maskin and Tirole (2001). With this state
space, given a belief µ, we can get the next time period µ′ with the Bayes’ rule. To
circumvent the first difficulty, instead of finding an “ǫ-belief”, we define an ǫ-stationary
belief. We assume that all agents believe the economy is in stationary equilibrium and
form beliefs of the stationary distribution over the state space. If the agent’s belief µ
satisfies ‖µ−µ′‖0 ≤ ǫ (‖·‖0 is the Kantorovich-Rubinstein norm), we can then say that
it is ǫ- stationary. The error term ǫ can be interpreted as the “level of irrationality”, or
the limit of the agent’s learning ability. The rational expectation equilibrium is then
a special case of the model (ǫ = 0). In equilibrium with heterogeneous agents, each
agent is associated with a “level of irrationality” ǫ and maximizes her utility with an
ǫ-stationary belief.
The main result of this paper is that for any positive ǫ, there exists a recursive
equilibrium (or stationary Markov equilibria in the terminology of stochastic games).
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Recursive equilibria are characterized by a pair of functions (characteristic functions):
a transition function mapping this period’s “state” into probability distributions over
next period’s state, and a “policy function” mapping the current state into current
prices and choices. The state space is set to be the current exogenous shock and the
beginning-of-period distribution of assets across individuals. This way of restricting
the state space is often considered “minimal” or “natural” and widely used in the
literature for both philosophical and practical reasons as follows. The philosophi-
cal reasons are the same as Maskin and Tirole’s (2001) reasons to consider Markov
perfect equilibria (MPE). On the practical side, recursive methods can be used to
approximate stationary Markov equilibria numerically. Heaton and Lucas (1996),
Krusell and Smith (1998), and Kubler and Schmedders (2003) are early examples of
papers that approximate stationary Markov equilibria in models with infinitely lived,
heterogeneous agents.
The recursive equilibrium of our model is compatible with the literature of be-
havioral and experimental economics. Bounded rational choices are often made not
because the agent does not “try hard enough” to optimize, but because of an incorrect
belief. Psychological effects found in the literature of behavioral and experimental
economics can be seen as biases from the correct belief. Intuitively, the larger the ǫ,
the more beliefs will the bounded rational agent accept and hence the more kinds of
heuristics may be used by the agent. On the theoretical side, focusing on recursive
equilibrium carries on our philosophy of modeling: since the economic models are
to compute the stationary Markov equilibria and make forecasts recursively, the as-
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sumption that the agents believe the equilibrium is stationary and behave recursively
comes natural.
Besides the general theoretical framework we show for modeling bounded ra-
tionality, we contribute to the literature of general equilibrium theory by showing
existence of a recursive equilibrium. With rational expectations, recursive equilib-
rium does not exist generically. This problem was first illustrated by Hellwig (1983)
and since then has been demonstrated in different contexts. Kubler and Schmedders
(2002) give an example showing the nonexistence of stationary Markov equilibria
in models with incomplete asset markets and infinitely lived agents. Santos (2002)
provides examples of nonexistence for economies with externalities. Kubler and Pole-
marchakis (2004) present such examples for overlapping generations (OLG) models.
Brumm et al. (2017) further provide one simple example demonstrating the possibil-
ity of nonexistence.
The nonexistence problem has been explained (dealt with) in the literature
from different angles. Hellwig (1983) ascribed the reason of nonexistence to the “the
simultaneous determination of prices for different periods”. He stated that “The con-
cept of a rational expectations equilibrium involves the simultaneous determination
of prices for different periods. This simultaneity conflicts with the sequential nature
of the temporary equilibrium process, so that rational expectations equilibria can
only be implemented if the auctioneer in each period is informed of past expecta-
tions and uses them to select his temporary equilibria.” Duffie et al. (1994) showed
existence of competitive equilibria for general Markovian exchange economies with
a different state space. The authors also proved that the equilibrium process is a
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stationary Markov process. However, we follow the well-established terminology in
dynamic games and do not refer to these equilibria as stationary Markov equilibria,
because the state space also contains consumption choices and prices from the previ-
ous period. Citanna and Siconolfi (2010 and 2012) provided sufficient conditions for
the generic existence of stationary Markov equilibria in OLG models. However, their
arguments cannot be extended to models with infinitely lived agents or to models
with occasionally binding constraints on agentsâĂŹ choices, and for their argument
to work in their OLG framework they need to assume a very large number of het-
erogeneous agents within each generation. Brumm et al. (2017) provided existence
for stochastic economies with stochastic productions by assuming that there are two
atomless shocks that are stochastically independent (conditional on a possible third
shock that can be arbitrary). This construction is provided first by Dugan (2012),
who proved the existence of Markov Perfect Equilibrium in noisy stochastic games.
The literature showing the existence of recursive equilibria usually take the
way of specifying the model set up such that although the agents do not make de-
cisions recursively, the optimal strategies take a recursive form in equilibrium. We
differ from the literature by reexamining the rational expectation assumption. Look-
ing back at why we are interested in recursive equilibria in the first place, rational
expectation assumption is actually inconsistent with the reasons: Philosophically, a
rational agent would not put any restrictions on the form of the strategy and would
consider the entire history to maximize utility; practically, the rational agent does
not need an efficient algorithm to compute the equilibria or to approximate equilibria
since she knows the analytical solution to the maximization problem. Simply put,
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when considering large complex economic systems, it is unrealistic to solve or compute
rational expectation strategies. So it is natural and necessary to consider bounded
rational behavior with recursive strategies that result in recursive equilibria.
There are two immediate applications of our model with the special case when ǫ
is very small. First, it lays foundation for numerically computed rational expectation
equilibria. With this set up, usual convergence criteria used in the computational
economics literature can be incorporated and thus many computed equilibria in the
literature using recursive methods can be categorized as bounded rational recursive
equilibria in the sense of this paper. Second, it can be viewed as an epsilon-equilibrium
existence result for models with heterogeneous heuristics. As we will show in more
detail later, this paper brings up one more dimension of heterogeneity. The epsilon-
equilibrium exists even if agents use different heuristics, e.g., some agents may use
the first moment of the distribution of asset holdings to optimize as in Krusell and
Smith (1998), while some agents may use sparse max in the sense of Gabiax (2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model
set up. Section 3 defines the bounded rational recursive equilibrium. Section 4 proves
existence of bounded rational equilibrium. Section 5 concludes the paper. Detailed
proofs can be found in the appendix.
The Economic Model
In this section we describe the model set up. To illustrate how we model
bounded rationality, the markets structure is adapted from the Lucas (1978) asset
pricing model. We can get the same result for more complex market structure with
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bounded asset holdings, but we use the Lucas (1978) model to simplify notations. The
first part of this section is the physical economy setup. The second part describes how
a bounded rational agent maximizes utility given a belief of the distribution of the
state space. The third part are some standard or weaker assumptions on the utility
function.
The Physical Economy
Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ N0. The exogenous shocks denoted
by z realize from an Euclidean space Z,2 and follow a first-order Markov process
with transition probability P(· | z) defined on the Borel σ-algebra Z on Z, P :
Z × Z → [0, 1]. Let (zt)∞t=0, or in short (zt), denote the stochastic process and let
(Ft) denote its natural filtration. A history of shocks up to some date t is denoted
by zt = (z0, z1, ..., zt).
There are H types of agents, h ∈ H = {1, ..., H}. There is one perishable
commodity and J Lucas trees, j ∈ J = {1, ..., J}, denote the prices normalized to
a simplex by p = (pc, pJ) ∈ ∆J . The Lucas trees are long-lived assets in unit net
supply that pay exogenous positive dividends in terms of a single consumption good
d : Z → RJ+. The agent h’s endowment is denoted by eh : Z → R+. The dividends
and endowments are time-invariant and measurable functions of the current shock.
X,Ξ are Euclidean spaces. The agent h’s consumption for period t is denoted by
xh,t ∈ Xh; her holding of financial assets is denoted by αh,t ∈ Ξh. The budget set is
2. In this paper, we use the Euclidean space because it is sufficient for the later proofs and
general enough to represent economic variables. It is not a necessary condition for our results.
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denoted by Γh : Z × Ξh ×∆J ⇒ Xh × Ξh. The consumption vector of the economy
is x ∈ X, the asset holdings vector is α ∈ Ξ. There is no short selling on trees,
and we restrict the asset holdings vector with financial markets clearing conditions,
Ξ = (∆H−1)J .
Denote the minimal state space by S = Z×Ξ− and associated Borel algebra by
S. Also, we specify an augmented state space that contains the exogenous shock, the
beginning-of-period asset holdings, the end-of-period asset holdings, and the prices
similar as Duffie et al. (1994). Denote the augmented state space by S̃ = Z× (Ξ− ×
Ξ×∆J) and associated Borel algebra by S̃.
The characteristic transition of the economy is
F : S → P(Ξ×∆J).
In the sense of Aliprantis and Border (2006) Chapter 19.2, we denote the associated
transition kernel kF .
Then the Markov transition of the augmented state space F̃ : S̃ → P(S̃) gener-
ated by F,P is defined as follows, for any s̃0 = [z0, (α−0 , α0, p0)] and letting µ = F̃ (s0),
we have:
(i) the marginal on Z is denoted by µZ = P(· | z0), and the marginal on Ξ− is
µΞ− = δα0 almost surely;




Similarly, we denote the associated transition kernel by kF̃ .
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Utility Maximization of Agents
Given the economy described above, the agent h believes that the economy is in
stationary equilibrium and the stationary distribution is µh ∈ P(S̃). Then she would
maximize utility using the Bayes’ rule with an information set Ih ∈ Ih, where Ih is a
finite dimensional Euclidean space. We first specify the structure of the information
set, and then introduce the utility maximization problem.
Information structure
The information set of agent Ih ∈ Ih consists of two parts, the price p ∈ ∆J
and the information of asset holdings of other agents fhI : Ξ−h ×Ξ−h → Ih,α.
Assumption 9 1. Ih,α is compact and convex for all h ∈ H;
2. fhI is continuous for all h ∈ H.
This set up is general and can incorporate many forms of information struc-
tures commonly used in the literature. We give three special cases that satisfy As-
sumption 9 as examples.
Special Case 1. fhI (α
−
−h, α−h) is a subset of (α
−
−h, α−h) for all h ∈ H. The
agents would have partial information of asset holdings of the economy. This setting
is the same as the “sparse max” agents used by Gabaix (2014), when agents do not
put any weight on the omitted information.
Special Case 2. fhI (α
−
−h, α−h) is the first several moments of α
−
−h. The agents
would use the match of moments to describe the distribution of asset holdings among
agents. This setting is the same as the bounded rational agents used by Krusell and
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Smith (1998). Although Krusell and Smith (1998) assumed a continuum of agents in
the model, the computation part had to use a large number of agents.
Special Case 3. fhI (α
−
−h, α−h) = (α
−
−h, α−h) for all h ∈ H. The agents would
have full information of asset holdings of the economy. This setting also shows that
Assumption 9 is harmless in the sense that it incorporate the full information setting.
It will be shown that with this special case, many computed equilibira with recursive
method in the literature with rational expectation assumption are in fact bounded
rational recursive equilibria as described in the next section. One example is the
computed equilibira by Kubler and Schmedders (2003).
Utility function given a belief of an equilibrium distribution
Given probability space (S̃, S̃, µh), each agent h chooses an arbitrary random
variable Th : S̃ → S̃.3 Denote the regular conditional probability measure of µh on
A associated with Th as µh(· | A), and denote the marginal of µh(· | A) on b as
µh,b(· | A). Then the prediction of the distribution of the next period’s information
set Qh[I ′h | (z









h | (α, z
′)]µα[dα | Ih].
With P and Qh, we get the overall predicted transition probability as
Rh[(z





3. Th is defined so that conditional probability can be well defined. In the construction of a
recursive equilibrium later, Th does not affect the equilibrium.
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Easy to check that Rh[(z′, I ′h) | (z, Ih)] is a transition probability. Denote
Rh[(zt+1, Ih,t+1) | (zt, Ih,t)] by Rh(t) for short, and define µth, t ≥ 0 in the same way as
in 8.2 of Stokey (1989):








Rh(t− 1)Rh(t− 1) · · · Rh(0),
where A1, ..., At ⊂ Z× Ih.
With the single period utility function uh : Z×Xh → R, each agent maximizes
a time-separable expected utility function. For a given sequence


















t | (z0, Ih,0))
Each agent maximizes the total utility subject to the budget constraint.
Uµhh (z0, α
−








s.t. (xh,t(zt, Ih,t), αh,t(zt, Ih,t)) ∈ Γ(zt, α−h,t, pt)
To compare this utility to the rational expectation utility, consider the special
case 3 mentioned above, where the agents have full information about asset holdings
in the economy. If the belief distribution µh is the “true” stationary equilibrium (if it
exists), then the utility function coincides with rational expectation utility.
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Assumptions
A few more standard assumptions are needed for later proofs.
Assumption 10 Z is compact and convex. For all z ∈ Z, P(· | z) is absolutely
continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure with density p(· | z).
Assumption 11 1. eh, d are bounded measurable functions. Further, there are




eh(z) ≤ ē, 0 < dj(z) < d̄.
2. The agents’ discount factor satisfies δ ∈ (0, 1).
3. The utility functions uh : Z × X → R are measurable in z, continuous,
strictly increasing and concave in x.
The two assumptions above are standard in the literature, and we relaxed
the assumption that the utility functions are differentiable. Another assumption is
needed to keep the consumption and asset holding choices bounded.
Assumption 12 The agent cannot consume more than the aggregate amount of the








This assumption is needed because the bounded rational agent perceives the
future differently from the true distribution. Combined with Assumption 11, the
budget set is




h − eh(z)) + pJ(α
−
h − αh) ≤ 0
}
∩B.
Bounded Rational Recursive Equilibrium
With the model set up above, we go on to define the bounded rational recur-
sive equilibrium in this section. First, we introduce the concept of an ǫ-stationary
measure. And then we define a bounded rational competitive equilibrium given belief
distributions. Last we define the bounded rational recursive equilibrium.
ǫ-Stationary Measure
Consider a state space (A,A), where A is a compact convex subset of a finite
dimensional Euclidean space and A is the Borel algebra. Denote a Markov transition
as a Borel measurable function by P : A → P(A). Denote the associated Markov
transition kernel by kP : A×A → [0, 1].

















f ∈ Lip1(A), ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1
}
,
where Lip1(A) := {f : S → R| | f(x)− f(y) |≤| x− y |, ∀x, y ∈ A} .
Denote the space of those test functions as L(A) = {f ∈ Lip1(A) : ‖f‖∞ ≤ 1}. By
theorem 8.3.2 of Billingsley(2013), the topology generated by ‖ · ‖0 coincides with the
weak topology on P(A).
The agent is associated with an arbitrarily small parameter ǫ > 0. The agent’s
rationality is bounded in the sense that she would consider two measures “close”
enough if the Kantorovich-Rubinshtein distance is within ǫ. We call a measure ǫ-
stationary with respect to P if it is “close” enough to its transition under P .
Definition 2 (ǫ-stationary measure) Measure µ is said to be ǫ-stationary with
respect to P if ‖µ− µ′P‖0 ≤ ǫ.
Definition of Recursive Equilibrium
µh-Competitive Equilibrium
Different from rational expectation models, the agents perceive the future
differently. So the maximization problems need to be restated for each time period.
To put it more formally, we define the bounded rational competitive equilibrium as
follows:
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a µh-competitive equilibrium, given initial conditions z ∈ Z, α−h ∈ Ξ, consists
of prices and choices,
(p, (xh, αh)h∈H)
such that markets clear and each agent h optimizes utility with respect to µh–that is
to say, (A), (B), and (C) hold.
























, ∀h ∈ H,
where the budget set is
Γ(zt, α
−
h,t, pt) = {pc,t(xh,t + d(zt)α
−
h,t − eh(zt)) + pJ,t(α
−
h,t − αh,t) ≤ 0} ∩B,
and






With strictly increasing utility functions, this equilibrium can be represented
by ((αh)h∈H, p) using the budget constraint. Since there is only one commodity, the
consumption is fixed once the asset holdings are known.
Bounded Rational Recursive Equilibrium
With the µh-competitive equilibrium defined, the bounded rational recursive
equilibrium is essentially a µh-competitive equilibrium with ǫh-stationary measures
µh as beliefs.
An bounded rational recursive equilibrium (F, (µh)h∈H) consists of a character-
istic transition
F : S → P(Ξ×∆J)





Such that for all initial conditions s0 ∈ S, ((αh)h∈H, p) is a µh-competitive equilibrium
if ((αh)h∈H, p) ∈ suppF (s0).
Again, recall the special case 3, if ǫh = 0, we will have a recursive equilibrium
with rational agents.
Existence of Bounded Rational Recursive Equilibrium
In this section, we show that for arbitrary ǫh > 0, h ∈ H, a bounded rational
recursive equilibrium exists. Since we are most concerned with the smallest ǫh among
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agents, we write ǫ in this section to simplify notations. One crucial part of the
proof is to find continuous (or upper hemi-continuous and convex valued) policy
functions (or correspondences) of the agents. With standard assumptions and rational
expectation, continuous policy functions may not exist. But intuitively we can find
continuous functions that are very “close” to the “true” policy functions. Although
bounded rational agents are less “smart” than rational agents, the policy functions of
bounded rational agents are more complex. This is due to the fact that the belief is a
distribution over the state space. The policy of a bounded rational agent is a function
of not only the natural state variables and the prices, but also the characteristic
transition of the whole economy from which the ǫ-stationary belief is formed. This
also distinguish our model from traditional epsilon-equilibrium models.
The essence of the proof is finding a fixed point of a characteristic transition.
We construct a recursive equilibrium with continuous policy functions. To do so, the
bounded rational agent would not only form an ǫ-stationary belief on the equilibrium
path, but also knows how to form beliefs given any characteristic transitions. We
call the function that maps a characteristic transition to an ǫ-stationary belief the
perceivable model constructed by the bounded rational agent. With the beliefs, the
agents optimize with the Bayes’ rule, and the agents’ strategies forms a new char-
acteristic transition. Then the fixed point of the characteristic transition gives us a
recursive equilibrium. This section has three parts: First, we construct a continuous
perceivable model for any ǫ > 0. Second, we construct a continuous policy function.
Third, we show the main theorem of this paper.
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Perceivable Model Constructed by Bounded Rational Agents
We first show that for any characteristic transition, there exists an ǫ-stationary
distribution with a continuous density function. Then we define a characteristic per-
ceivable model as a function that maps a characteristic transition to a ǫ-stationary
continuous density function. Further, we show the existence of a continuous perceiv-
able model: a continuous function that maps a characteristic transition with its weak
topology to a continuous density function with the sup norm.
Continuous Density Functions
The first challenge of the proof is to find an ǫ-stationary belief with a contin-
uous density function. Given an arbitrary characteristic transition, it is not trivial
that there exists an ǫ-stationary belief. Further, given an ǫ-stationary belief, it does
not necessarily have a density function. So we show in the first theorem that for
any strictly positive ǫ, there exists an ǫ-stationary belief with a continuous density
function.
Let (N(A), ‖·‖∞) be the subset of (Cb(A), ‖·‖∞) such that for any f ∈ N(A),
we have f ≥ 0,
∫
A
fdλ = 1 so that the elements are all density functions. Denote
the measure with density function f as µf . Then we define an ǫ-stationary density
function for agent h as follows.
Definition 3 (ǫ-stationary continuous density) A function f is an
ǫ-stationary continuous density function with respect to P if f ∈ N(A) and ‖µf −
µ′f,P‖0 ≤ ǫ.
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Theorem 3 For any ǫ > 0, the set of ǫ-stationary continuous density functions
Υ(ǫ, P ) is non-empty, convex, and closed.
Continuous Perceivable Model
Now that we know there exists a continuous density function given a charac-
teristic transition, we go on to find a way the bounded rational agent construct a
continuous perceivable model. Intuitively, the agents would form similar beliefs given
similar characteristic transitions.
Denote the space of the λ-equivalent class of Markov kernels kP : A×A → [0, 1]
as KA, and equip it with the weak topology τ(λ) defined as in 2.2 of Häusler, Erich,
and Harald Luschgy (2015):











for every f ∈ L1 and h ∈ Cb.
Then by Theorem 2.7 of Häusler, Erich, and Harald Luschgy (2015), we have
KA with τ(λ) is a non-empty, weakly compact and convex subset of a locally convex
Hausdorff space. We call a function mapping KA into P(A) a perceivable model.
The agent gets a computed distribution given any Markov transition. Then we define
a continuous perceivable model as follows.
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Definition 4 (continuous perceivable model) A continuous perceivable
model is a function M : KA → N(A) that is continuous with respect to the τ(λ) weak
topology and the ‖ · ‖∞ uniform norm.
Theorem 4 For any ǫ > 0, there exists a continuous perceivable model M such that




Corollary 1 For any ǫ > 0, there exists a continuous perceivable model M with a
positive lower bound b > 0 such that for all kp ∈ KA, ‖µM(kp) − µ
′
M(kp),P
‖0 ≤ ǫ, and
infkp M(kp) ≥ b.
Denote the set of all continuous perceivable models satisfying conditions in
Corollary 1 as Mǫ(A), and denote the space of continuous density functions bounded
below by b as Nb(A).
Existence of u.h.c. Policy Functions
In this section, we construct continuous policy functions for bounded rational
agents. We first provide sufficient conditions under which the following functional
equation is equivalent as the utility function,
V µhh (z, α
−
h , Ih) = maxαh,xh










With the budget set
αh, xh ∈ Γ(z, α
−
h , p)
And the corresponding policy correspondence attains the maximum utility level.
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Assumption 13 Z,X,Ξ are compact and convex.
Assumption 14 Γh : Z × Ξh × ∆
J ⇒ Xh × Ξh is weakly measurable, non empty,
compact valued, and continuous in Ξh ×∆
J for all h.
Assumption 15 uh : Z ×X → R is a bounded Caratheodry function for all h, and
is strictly increasing, and concave in x .
Define a continuous pricing density function as follows, and denote the Banach space
of all those functions as (Q(Ih × (Z× Ih)), ‖ · ‖∞).
Definition 5 (continuous pricing density function) q : (Ih×(Z×Ih)) → R
is a continuous pricing density function if
1. q is jointly continuous in all arguments;




q(i | s)di = 1, q(· | s) ≥ 0).
Assumption 16 Qh is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure with
density function qµh. And qµh ∈ Q.
Theorem 5 Under Assumption 13- 16, for all qµh ∈ Q, there exists a unique
bounded function V
qµh









is jointly continuous in (α−h , Ih, qµh), strictly increasing, and concave in α
−
h , and is




h , Ih) is u.h.c., and convex val-




h , Ih) is measurable in z and admits a mea-
surable selector.
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The proof has a similar structure as Theorem 9.2 in Stokey(1989) and is given in
detail in the appendix.
The Main Theorem
In this section, we state the main steps of the fixed point argument and our
main theorem.
Recall the compact set A. Let A = S̃ for Corollary 1 and denote the cor-
responding lower bound as b′. Denote Nb′(S̃) as the space of continuous density
functions bounded below by b′. Then we can find a continuous mapping from a
continuous density function to a continuous pricing density function.
Lemma 9 Under Assumption 10, for any f ∈ Nb′(S̃) with associated µf , qµf is
continuous in all its arguments and uniformly continuous in f .
With this Lemma and Theorem 5, we can prove the existence of a bounded
rational competitive equilibrium.
Lemma 10 Under Assumption 9- 12, for any function fh ∈ Nb′(S̃) and initial con-
ditions zt ∈ Z, α
−
h,t ∈ Ξ, there exists a µfh-competitive equilibrium, where µfh is the
measure with density function fh.
Denote the space of the λ-equivalent class of Markov kernels k : S×S → [0, 1]
as K, and the space of the λ-equivalent class of Markov kernels k : S̃× S̃ → [0, 1] as
KF̃ . Equip both of them with the τ(λ) weak topology, and recall the definition of
kF̃ , we have the following lemma.
Lemma 11 Under Assumption 10, kF̃ is continuous in kF under weak topologies.
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Theorem 6 Under Assumption 9- 12, for arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, bounded rational
recursive equilibrium exists.
By Corollary 1, we can choose a continuous perceivable model Mh ∈ Mǫ(S̃)
for each agent h. Then by Lemma 11, kF̃ is continuous in kF . So we can find for
each agent a continuous mapping Nh : K → Nb′(S̃), where K is equipped with τ(λ)
and Nb′(S̃) with ‖ · ‖∞.
For any kF ∈ K, given s ∈ S̃, choose fh = Nh(kF ). Denote the set of µfh-
competitive equilibria as RF (s). Let R(kF ) be the set of (equivalence classes of)
measurable selections of RF . For all Y ∈ R(kF ), we embed Y (S̃) into P(S̃) via
Y (s) 7→ δY (s), and denote δY as the transition kernel generated by the embedding.
Since Y is measurable by definition, we get δY ∈ K. Denote the set K′(kF ) := {δY :
Y ∈ R(kF )}, and the closure of the convex hull of K′(kF ) as c̄oK′(kF ). Clearly,
c̄oK′(kF ) ⊂ K. We show in the appendix that the map K → c̄oK′(kF ) has a fixed
point and generate the bounded rational recursive equilibrium from the fixed point.
Conclusion
This paper provides a general way of modeling bounded rationality. Yet,
many aspects of behavior economics literature cannot be incorporated, especially the
findings about preferences such as loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting. we prove
the existence of the recursive equilibrium in a dynamic stochastic model with bounded
rational agents. This set up is realistic when the economy is large and complex, which
is a fact for a lot of markets. A large and complex economy would affect the agents
in two ways: first, each agent would rely on recursive methods to optimize utility;
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second, each agent cannot solve for the stationary equilibrium analytically and has
to approximate an equilibrium distribution.
The entire part of constructing a continuous value function does not put extra
assumptions on the model, it provides one additional interpretation of what the ratio-
nality is bounded by – that is, the agent’s choices are continuous in the information
she observes. This is consistent with the philosophical principles stated in Maskin
and Tirole (2001). Also, the continuous value function is analogous to the continuity
assumption of the utility function in the static exchange economy models.
Although relatively abstract, this model has the potential to explore dynamic
economic models further in multiple ways. First, it may provide foundation for many
algorithms computing general equilibrium models. As we stated before, examples like
the computationally part of Krusell and Smith (1998) and Kubler and Schmedders
(2003) can be incorporated into my set up. Second, it may generate interesting
economic processes from standard set up. As we can see from the proof, although
the equilibrium is recursive, the Markov process of the whole economy may not be
ergodic. This may provide a new angle to study business cycles and financial crisis
from a standard model set up. Third, it provides a new dimension of heterogeneity
among agents, i.e. they may use different heuristics. And last, it contributes to
finding a general theory of bounded rationality.
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Proofs of Section 4.1
Proof of Theorem 3
By the way it is defined, (N(A), ‖ · ‖∞) is a convex, Hausdorff locally convex
topological vector space. The very first task is to find a compact subset of N(A).
Consider the space of Hölder continuous functions Cα(A), α ∈ (0, 1) with the norm
‖f‖α = ‖f‖∞+ | f |α, where | f |α= sup
x 6=y
| f(x)− f(y) |
| x− y |α
.
Denote the subset of Cα(A) uniformly bounded in ‖ · ‖α by M as CαM(A),
it is compact. Further we have NM(A) := N(A) ∩ CαM(A) is compact for any
M ∈ (0,+∞).
For any Markov transition P , denote the associated transition operator by P




Define a correspondence GM as:
GM(f) ⇒ {f
′ ∈ NM(A) : ‖µf ′ −P
′µf‖0 ≤ ǫ}, ∀f ∈ N(A).
To prove the theorem, it is equivalent to show that for a large enough M , there
exists a fixed point of GM . The proof is structured as follows.
First we show that for large enough M , GM is non-empty, compact, convex
valued. Equip P(A) with the weak* topology σ(P ,Cb). Since A is compact, this
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coincide with the vague topology σ(P ,Cc). And let L∞(A,A, λ) be the space of
essentially bounded measurable (equivalent classes of) functions equipped with the
weak* topology σ(L∞, L1). By Theorem 19.9(2) of Aliprantis and Border (2006), for
all f ∈ N(A), P′µf ∈ P(A). The following lemma provides a function f̂ ∈ NM(A)
as an approximate density function for P′µf .
Lemma 12 Given ǫ > 0, there exists an N < +∞ such that ∀M ≥ N, ∀f ∈ N(A),
GM(f) is non-empty valued.
Proof: Consider s ∈ A with the embedding δs ∈ P(A), we can construct
a sequence of nascent delta functions ηN(· | s) ∈ NN(A) such that limN→+∞ ηN(· |
s) → δs in the sense of vague topology (which coincides with the weak*-topology on
A). As an example, consider the following mollifier:
ηN(x | s) = N
dim(A)ϕ(Nx | s),
where











2)/Const if | x− s |< 1
0 if | x− s |≥ 1
.

















Then by the symmetry of set A, we can easily construct a set of functions















This means we found an approximate density functions for all δs, s ∈ A,
namely all extreme points in P(A). By theorem 15.10 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006), P(A) ⊂ c̄oA. Take the closure of convex hull of η̂s accordingly. Since the
convex hull of η̂s is uniformly bounded by N in the ‖ · ‖α, the limit points also lie in


















Combined with the fact that P′µf ∈ P(A), we have GM(f) is not empty. 
Lemma 13 For any f ∈ N(A), GM(f) is convex and close valued.
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Proof: For any f ′1, f
′
2 ∈ GM(f), consider the convex combination f
′ = βf ′1 +




































































































≤ βǫ+ (1− β)ǫ
= ǫ.
So f ′ ∈ GM(f), it is convex. Next, consider f ′n
unif.
−−−→ f ′, f ′n ∈ GM(f). Notice
first f ′ ∈ N(A) under uniform convergence. Using prove by contradiction, assume


































































|f ′(s)− f ′n(s)| dλ(s) ≥ ǫ
′ − ǫ > 0 for all n, which contradicts uniform
convergence of f ′n. So GM(·) is close valued. 
Now we have GM is non-empty, compact, convex valued. Then we show that
it is also u.h.c., and then the Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan theorem applies.
Lemma 14 GM(·) is u.h.c..







(PfL)(s)dµf (s) by the way P,P′ are defined. By Theorem
19.7(4) of Aliprantis and Border (2006), PfL ∈ Bb(A). It is also easy to check that





































Now consider a sequence of functions fn
unif.
−−−→ f , and let f ′n
unif.
−−−→ f ′ where






























































































|fn − f | dλ+
∫
A





|fn − f | dλ+
∫
A
|f ′n − f
′| dλ
−→ ǫ.
So we have f ′ ∈ GM(f). 
Now choose M > N as in Lemma A.1. By the Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan
theorem, the set of fixed points of GM : NM(A) ⇒ NM(A) is non-empty. So the set
of computationally invariant density functions Υ(ǫ, P ) is non-empty. The final part
of the proof is to show that it is also convex and close valued. It is analogous to
Lemma 5 and concludes the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4
To simplify notations, redefine Υ(ǫ, P ) in a slightly different way: Define a
correspondence H as:
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H(kP ) ⇒ {f ∈ N(A) : ‖µf −P
′µf‖0 ≤ ǫ}, ∀kP ∈ KA.
Lemma 15 H is l.h.c..
Proof: By definition, we need to show ∀kPm ⇀ kP , ∀f ∈ H(kP ), there exists
a subsequence of kPmk such that ∃fk ∈ H(kPmk ), fk → f .





















Then further we have,
‖µf −P
′
mµf‖0 → ‖µf −P
′µf‖0.
So if f ∈ H(kP ) and ‖µf −P′µf‖0 < ǫ, there exists m1 such that for m ≥ m1,
‖µf−P
′
mµf‖0 < ǫ. Choose mk = m1+k and fk = f , we get fk ∈ H(kPmk ), fk
unif.
−−−→ f .
Otherwise, if f ∈ H(kP ) and ‖µf−P′µf‖0 = ǫ. By theorem 3, there is also f ′ ∈
H(kP ) such that ‖v3− v3Π‖ ≤ ǫ/2 < ǫ (By choosing ǫ/2 as the lower bound). By the
convexity of Υ(ǫ, P ), there exists a sequence fk
unif.
−−−→ f such that ‖µfk −P
′µfk‖0 < ǫ.




mµfk‖0 < ǫ. Then let m1 = m(1) and mk = max{m(k),mk−1 + 1}, k ≥ 2.
And we have fk ∈ H(kPmk ), fk
unif.
−−−→ f . 
Given in Theorem 3 that the correspondence is convex, close valued, by Michael
selection theorem, there exists a continuous selection.
Proof of Corollary 1
The proof is analogous to Lemma 6 and can be provided upon request.
Proofs of Section 4.2 (Theorem 5)
First, we define an operator Mqµf that projects bounded, Caratheodry func-
tions to bounded, Caratheodry functions for all bounded, Caratheodry pricing density
qµ ∈ Q. And Mqµf is jointly continuous in ((αh, Ih), qµ) . Mqµf is defined by















Given z′ ∈ Z and qµ is continuous with compact support. So qµ is bounded. Then by
Theorem 19.7 of Aliprantis and Border (2006), Mqµf is measurable in z. Now fix z
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The first term converges to 0 because f and qµ are continuous in (αh, Ih); the second




h , Ih)) = maxαh,xh
uh(z, xh) + δ(Mqµf)(z, αh, Ih)
αh, xh ∈ Γ(z, α
−
h , p)
For given (α−h , Ih, qµ), by Theorem 18.19 in Aliprantis and Border (2006),







































The first term converges to 0 because Tqmµ f(z, ·) is continuous according to the max-
imum theorem. For the second term, since f is bounded, for a given z, uh(z, xh) +
δ(Mqµf)(z, αh, Ih) is uniformly continuous in qµ. So the maximum over the same
compact budget set also converges to 0.
Then by induction with the same argument as above, we have T nqµf is measur-
able in z and jointly continuous in (α−h , Ih, qµ) for all n ∈ N++
Easy to check that Blackwell’s sufficient conditions are satisfied for Tqµ for all
qµ ∈ Q. Then take any Caratheodry function f0, and we have the value function
V qµ = T∞qµ f0. Obviously, V
qµ is measurable in z and jointly continuous in α−h , Ih, qµ.
More specifically, choose a Caratheodry function f̂0 that is strictly increasing,
and concave in α−h . Analogously, we get V
qµ = T∞qµ f̂0 is measurable in z and jointly
continuous in α−h , Ih, qµ and strictly increasing, and concave in α
−
h . The equivalence
of the functional equation and the utility function is directly implied. To describe the
policy correspondence, notice
V qµ(z, α−h , Ih) = maxαh,xh















αh, xh ∈ Γ(z, α
−
h , Ih).




h , Ih) is u.h.c., and convex valued in
(α−h , Ih, qµh). And fix (α
−





h , Ih) is measurable in z and admits a measurable selector. 
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Proofs in Section 4.3
Proof of Lemma 9











′, α))fα(α | Ih)dλ(α), (2.1)
fI and fα are defined as follows:







where Sα,Ih = {s : z(s) = z, Ih(s) = Ih, α(s) = α} and SIh = {s : z(s) = z, Ih(s) =















,(z′,α) = {s : z(s) = z
′, α−(s) = α, Ih(s) = I
′
h} and S(z′,α) = {s : z(s) =
z′, α−(s) = α}.
Easy to check, the four integrals in the definitions of fI , fα are bounded linear
transformations of f . Hence, they are all uniformly continuous in f . Further, if
f ∈ NJb′(S), all these four integrals are bounded away from 0. Then we have fI , fα
are uniformly continuous in f and hence fI · fα is uniformly continuous in f . Next,
notice the integration in (1) is also a bounded linear operator. So we have qµf is
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uniformly continuous in f . And it is trivial to check that qµf is jointly continuous in
all its arguments. 
Proof of Lemma 11
To show that kF̃ is continuous in kF , consider a sequence kFn ⇀ kF in τ(λ),











By Theorem 2.6 of Häusler, Erich, and Harald Luschgy (2015), this is equivalent to


































f ′(s)g′(a)dP(z′ | z)dFn,(z′,α)(a)dλ(s).













p(z′ | z)g′(z′, α, α′, p′)dF(z′,α)(α
′, p′)dλ(z′).









p(z′ | z)Bdλ(z′) = B.












Proof of Lemma 10
Given f ∈ Nb′(S̃), by Lemma 3.2, we have qµf ∈ Q. Combined with As-
sumptions 4.1-4.3, all the assumptions in section 3 are satisfied. So the equilibrium
conditions are equivalent to the following conditions:





















Define a price player’s best response ψ : X×Ξ ⇒ ∆J by











Then the standard existence proof of a static exchange economy applies. See, for
example, Lemma 3 of Brumm et al. (2017). 
Proof of Theorem 6
First, notice that s ⇒ RF (s) is measurable. This is shown in the proof of
Lemma 4 of Brumm et al.(2017). Then by theorem 18.13 of Aliprantis and Bor-
der(2006), RF has a measurable selector. So the map kF ⇒ R(kF ) is non-empty
valued. Then in the same way as the second part of the proof of Lemma 4 of Brumm
et al.(2017), we can get kF ⇒ R(kF ) has a closed graph. Then by the definition of
K′ as a subset of K equipped with τ(λ), we have kF ⇒ K′(kF ) has a closed graph.
Then theorem 17.35(1) in Aliprantis and Border(2006) implies that kF ⇒ c̄oK′(kF )
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has a closed graph. Apply Kakutani-Glicksberg-Fan theorem, we have a fixed point
k∗F ∈ c̄oK
′(k∗F ).
If k∗F ∈ coK




F ). Then (F
∗, (µf∗
h
)h∈H) is a ǫ-bounded
rational equilibrium.
If k∗F /∈ coK
′(k∗F ), we make use of the fact that ǫ is arbitrarily small, and
repeat the procedure above for ǫ′ = ǫ/2. And we find another fixed point k′F ∈
c̄oK′(k′F ). If k
′
F /∈ coK
′(k′F ), then we can choose k
′′
F ∈ coK
′(k′F ) within an arbitrary




F ) such that (F
′′, (µf ′
h
)h∈H) is a ǫ-bounded
rational equilibrium. 
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Chapter 3
Self-justified momentum and eleven puzzles in macro-finance
This article provides a simple dynamic general equilibrium model that can generate
short-term momentum and long-term reversal effect of excess stock returns with in-
complete markets due to collateral constraints. The model also helps to understand
quantitatively some of the puzzling empirical regularities in macro-finance stated by
Campbell (2003) and Gabiax (2012). We assume there are two types of bounded ra-
tional agents: the fundamentalists and the speculators. The fundamentalists believes
that future asset prices are determined by the exogenous shocks and dividends. The
speculator believes the excess stock return has a short-term momentum and long-term
reversal regardless of exogenous shocks. These beliefs are not common knowledge. In
equilibrium, both agents maximize utilities with these beliefs and markets clear. Both
types of agents are bounded rational in the sense that they both partially capture the
law of motion of the asset prices in equilibrium. We show that in calibrated simula-
tions, both types of agents survive and there is a significant short-term momentum of
excess stock returns. The calibrated data helps to explain eleven puzzling empirical
regularities.
Introduction
We use Mehra and Prescott (1985) as the starting point of our introduction.
Since the famous equity premium puzzle was presented, numerous attempts have
been made to explain the effect on both theoretical and empirical sides. Meanwhile,
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more and more puzzles in the field of macro-finance have been found in recent em-
pirical studies. Campbell (2000) provides a thorough overview of outstanding papers
in the field. With all these advances in the literature, it is almost common sense
that concepts such as representative agent, complete market, rational expectations
are too-strong-to-be-realistic assumptions. With my limited understanding of the lit-
erature, I categorize the approaches to solve macro-finance puzzles on the spectrum
from "determinismists” to "free-willists". The pure "determinismists" believes that
the economy evolves "deterministically" once the exogenous shocks are given and
those puzzling findings exists because we did not characterize the exogenous shocks
perfectly. Barro (2006), Gabiax (2012) showed that rare disasters help to explain
asset pricing puzzles. Bansal and Yoran (2004) shows that there exists a long-run
persistent risk. With more complex exogenous shocks, there are inevitably more pa-
rameters to help fitting empirical data. The game of the pure "determinismists" is
then to use as few parameters as possible to fit more moments of the data. The pure
"free-willists" take the tool of behavioral finance. They believe the agents are free
to make economic decisions even if they are irrational and does not maximize utility
functions. Psychology and neuroscience are brought into the field of economics and
finance. Besides, they are also the provider of many of the existing puzzles. Findings
of Shiller (2015) showed many empirical facts that cannot be explained by traditional
models with the rational expectation assumption. However, there is still no unified
theory to explain the consistent existence of the irrational behaviors. In between these
two approaches, there are also near "determinismists" who believes that instead of
the researcher herself, the agents in the model does not characterize the exogenous
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shocks perfectly. They focus on asymmetric information, common knowledge, and
partially observable shocks. Huo and Takayama (2015) explains business cycles with
higher-order beliefs. And then more to the side of free-will, there are models with
bounded rational agents. Krusell and Smith (1998) method is wildly used in macro
economic studies, where the agents in the model use simple policy functions to max-
imize utility and those functions are in return justified by the equilibrium outcome.
Gabiax (2014) claims the agents use the sparse-max tool to make decision.
This paper lies between the near "free-willists" and the pure "free-willists".
We argue that the heterogeneity of agents are larger than proposed by the near
"free-willists". One example is the observation of Hong and Stein (2007). The large
trading volume can not be generated by the models mentioned above, only with a
larger disagreement among agents can this effect be explained. This paper can be
seem as an application of Geng (2018), where existence result of a more general model
in provided. In Geng (2018), the author proposed the idea that there can be a measure
of how irrational the agents are. And with a certain degree of irrationality, different
agents may have different strategies and make different decisions under the same
circumstance. One paper with a similar philosophy is Cao (2017), where the author
showed that with incomplete market, an overly optimistic agents not only survive
but also prosper by speculation. In this paper, we push further to assume both
types of agents in the economy are bounded rational. In this way, the disagreement
between agents may generate large trading volumes along with other properties found
in empirical studies. We focus on the following eleven puzzling empirical regularities:
(i) equity premium puzzle; (ii) excess volatility puzzle; (iii) fat tail of excess stock
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returns; (iv) predictability of aggregate stock returns with price-dividend ratios; (v)
short-term momentum of excess stock returns; (vi) long-term reversal of excess stock
returns; (vii) momentum effect of real interest rate; (viii) high trading volume puzzle;
(ix) asset price bubbles and market crashes; (x) often greater explanatory power
of characteristics than covariances for asset returns; (xi) common use of technical
analysis in the finance industry.
Back to Mehra and Prescott (1985), we use the same simple market structure
and two types of agents with heterogeneous beliefs to explain macro-finance puzzles.
We assume the two types of agents are fundamentalists and speculators. The funda-
mentalists believes the asset prices are determined by exogenous shocks and future
dividend payoffs. The speculators believes there exists a short-term momentum effect
of the excess stock return and speculates on it. In equilibrium, both types of agents
are justified in the sense that they both captures the law of motion of the asset prices
partially. There is another way to justify the existence of the two types of agents. The
fundamentalists believes there should not be speculators since if there is a consistent
momentum effect, everyone would speculate on it and the effect would disappear in
equilibrium. If there were no speculators, the fundamentalists will have the rational
belief and the model degress to Mehra and Prescott (1985)’s model. The specula-
tors exist because there is indeed a momentum effect in equilibrium. The simulation
shows that both types of agents survive in the long run and the simulated equilibrium
exhibits properties that helps to explain the listed asset pricing puzzles.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 set up the model;
section 3 shows the calibration and the simulation results; section 4 concluses the
paper.
The Economic Model
In this section we describe the model set up in three subsections. The first part
is the physical economy setup.The markets structure is adapted from the Mehra and
Prescott (1985). There is a one-period bond and a long-lived stock in the financial
market and one consumption good. The exogenous shock affects the dividend payoffs
of the stock. The financial market is incomplete due to a borrowing constraint on the
bond and a short-selling ban on the stock. The second part describes how both types
of bounded rational agents maximizes utility. The third part defines the equilibrium
and shows some properties about the equilibrium.
The Physical Economy
Time is discrete and denoted by t ∈ N0. The exogenous shocks denoted
by z realize from a two-state space Z = {1, 2}, and follow a first-order Markov
process with transition probability P(· | z) defined on the Borel σ-algebra Z on Z,
P : Z×Z → [0, 1]. Let (zt)∞t=0, or in short (zt), denote the stochastic process and let
(Ft) denote its natural filtration. A history of shocks up to some date t is denoted
by zt = (z0, z1, ..., zt).
There are two types of agents, h ∈ H = {F, S}, i.e. fundamentalists and
speculators. There is one perishable commodity , a one-period bond and a long-
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lived stock. The bond pays one unit of commodity on the next period, the stock
pays dividends each period in terms of consumption good d : Z → R+. The agent
h’s endowment is zero consistent with Mehra and Prescott (1985). The agent h’s
consumption for period t is denoted by ch,t ∈ R+; her holding of financial assets is
denoted by (θh,t, φh,t) ∈ Ξh. The prices of the stock and the bond are denoted by
(p, q) ∈ R2++. The budget set is denoted by Γh : Z × Ξh × R
2
++ ⇒ R+ × Ξh. The
consumption vector of the economy is c ∈ R2+, the asset holdings vector is (θ, φ) ∈ Ξ.
Utility Maximization of Agents
Given the economy described above, the fundamentalist believes that the fu-
ture asset prices are determined by exogenous shocks (zt) and the dividends (dt). So
in our model with two different exogenous shocks, the fundamentalist would assume
the future asset prices takes two values pF (z), qF (z). The fundamentalist would then
maximize the expected utility given the current asset prices and the belief of future
prices. Then speculator believes that there is a one period momentum of the excess
return of the stock and a reversal afterwards. Since the speculator ignores the exoge-
nous shock, the future excess stock return is then a deterministic process in her belief.
The speculator would then strictly prefer the stock or the bond given the current ex-
cess stock return. Given these subjective beliefs, we state their utility maximization
in more detail.
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We assume that both agents have time separable utility functions with the




, 0 < γ < +∞.









where β is the discount factor. We set a collateral constraint so that there will not be
default with any prices. With a collateral constraint on the bond and the short-selling
ban on the stock, the budget set of both agents can be described with
Γ(z, θ−h , φ
−
h , p, q) =
{




h , θh ≥ 0,−θhd ≤ φh ≤ (1− θh)d
}
.
This borrowing constraint is relatively tight, it ensures that the borrower can always
repay the debt with the dividend next period even if the price of the stock drops
to zero. With this borrowing constraint, we make sure that there is no default in
equilibrium.
The fundamentalist
For the fundamentalist, the future prices are determined by the exogenous
shock, we denote the future prices predicted by the fundamentalist by pF (z), qF (z).
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The maximization problem of the fundamentalist is then
VF (z0, θ
−, φ−, p, q) = max
{ct}∞0
UF ,
subject to (ct, θt, φt) ∈ Γ(zt, θt−1, φt−1, pF (zt), qF (zt)), ∀zt, t ≥ 0.
We assume the agent makes decisions recursively, and we write the value function
and the policy correspondence of the fundamentalist as
VF (z0, θ
−, φ−, p, q) = max
c0,θ0,φ0
u(c0) + EF {VF (z
′, θ0, φ0, pF (z
′), qF (z
′))} ,
subject to (c0, θ0, φ0) ∈ Γ(z0, θ−, φ−, p, q);
GF (z0, θ
−, φ−, p, q) = arg max
c0,θ0,φ0
u(c0) + EF {VF (z
′, θ0, φ0, pF (z
′), qF (z
′))} ,
subject to (c0, θ0, φ0) ∈ Γ(z0, θ−, φ−, p, q).
We make a simplifying assumption that the fundamentalist takes the complete-market
asset prices ans forecasts. In this way, the belief of the fundamentalist can be sim-
ply summarized as: the fundamentalist does not know there are speculators in the
economy. Indeed, if there are only fundamentalists in the economy, the borrowing
constraint would never bind and the market evolves in the same way as a complete
market. The asset prices would be the same as the forecasted prices by the funda-












































These prices also implicate that the fundamentalist would predict to buy a fixed
number of shares of the stock and no bond from the next period and always consume
the stock dividend from then on.
The speculator
For the speculator, she has beliefs about the future excess stock returns over






. Denote the future risk free rate by rf . She believes
that the future excess stock return follows the function rt = ft(rexcess0 ). Given the
excess stock returns, the speculator would decide to hold stock or bond, the optimal
choices always lie on the boundary. The realized return on the portfolio will be r0.
Notice that r0 is different from max{rexcess0 + rf , rf}. This is because the speculator
is constrained to short arbitrary amount on either asset. We make one simplified
assumption that the future (after the next period) portfolio return is max{rf , rt+rf}
(i.e. The speculator can hold only stock or only bond and will not be constrained).
We will further justify this assumption when we specify how to characterize rt. The
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future value function can be defined recursively as







subject to ct + ωt ≤ rt−1ωt−1, t ≥ 1.
We wrote the expectation sign because of the subjective belief of the speculator. But
the exogenous shock does not matter for the speculator since she predicts the future
excess returns deterministically and ignores the exogenous shocks. The value function
and the policy correspondence of the speculator are
VS(z0, θ





′, pθ0 + qφ0, r0)
}
,
subject to c0 ∈ Γ(z0, θ−, φ−, p, q);
GS(z0, θ





′, pθ0 + qφ0, r0)
}
,
subject to c0 ∈ Γ(z0, θ−, φ−, p, q).
With the setup above, the decision problem of the speculator is simplified to
deciding how much to consume today. And then the speculator will use the rest of
her wealth buy more higher return asset and short more lower return asset until she
is constrained. Next we define the recursive equilibrium with the two types of agents.
Bounded Rational Recursive Equilibrium
Because of the speculator, the state space of the economy is enlarged to include
the past asset prices p−, q−. A bounded rational recursive equilibrium, given initial
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conditions z ∈ Z, (θ−h , φ
−
h ) ∈ Ξ, (p
−, q−) ∈ R2++, consists of prices and choices,
((p, q), (ch, θh, φh)h∈{F,S})
such that markets clear and each agent h optimizes utility–that is to say, (A), (B),
and (C) hold.

















−, q−, p, q), ∀h ∈ {F, S}.
An existence result of this kind of equilibrium can be found in Geng (2018).One
characteristic of the bounded rational recursive equilibrium is that there are usually
multiple equilibria. To circumvent this complication, in later sections, we use cali-
brated parameters and show that the simulated equilibrium path exhibits properties
that help explain asset pricing puzzles in the literature.
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Results
This section shows the simulation results and discussions about the eleven
puzzles. The first part explains the calibrated parameter values; the second part ex-
plains the simulation process in detail; the last part shows properties of the generated
equilibrium and discussions.
Parameter calibrations
We use β = 0.98 and γ = 4. The value of β is widely used in the literature
and the risk aversion coefficient is within the reasonable range of acceptable values
(not bigger than 5). The dividends are consistent with Mehra and Prescott (1985)
with µ = 0.018, δ = 0.036, and d(1) = 1 + µ + δ, d(2) = 1 + µ − δ. The exogenous
shock follows an iid process with P (1) = P (2) = 0.5. This is slightly different from
Mehra and Prescott (1985) to simplify computations. The predicting function of
excess returns f1(r0) = 0.8r0,and ft(r0) ≤ 0, t ≥ 2. The prediction of future risk
free rate is 1
β
. The speculator believes the excess stock return will have a one-period
momentum, and then disappear afterwards.
Solution and simulation parameters
Given the same state variables, there are multiple equilibria. This is due to
the fact that the speculator would behave differently give today’s equity premium,
yet the behavior of the speculator in turn affect today’s asset prices and hence to-
day’s equity premium. First, more obviously, there may be two equilibria when the
fundamentalist is not constrained by the collateral requirement: One start with the
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speculator behaves as if there is a positive equity premium and the equilibrium equity
premium is positive; the other with the speculator behaves as if there is a non-positive
equity premium and the equilibrium equity premium is non-positive. These two equi-
libria may not exist simultaneously. Also, there may exist other equilibria when both
agents are constrained. Because of the disagreement between agents, both of them
would want to borrow(sell) more if not constrained. In this case, we also need to fix
a risk-free rate. For the simulation, we take 1.048 and 0.85 with respect to positive
and non-positive equity premiums. We start with an initial wealth of 0.5 share of the
total stock and no debt for both agents. We simulate 20,000 periods and discard the
first 5,000 periods.
Equilibrium properties
The properties of the simulated equilibrium helps to understand the following
asset pricing puzzles quantitatively. (i) equity premium puzzle; (ii) excess volatility
puzzle; (iii) fat tail of excess stock returns; (iv) predictability of aggregate stock
returns with price-dividend ratios; (v) short-term momentum of excess stock returns;
(vi) long-term reversal of excess stock returns; (vii) momentum effect of real interest
rate; (viii) high trading volume puzzle; (ix) asset price bubbles and market crashes; (x)
often greater explanatory power of characteristics than covariances for asset returns;
(xi) common use of technical analysis in the finance industry.
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Autocorrelations of asset returns
The simulation shows that there is a first-order autocorrelation of excess stock
returns, consistent with the speculator’s belief. Also, the two to fourth-order autocor-
relation are significantly negative, also consistent with the speculator’s belief. These
results help to explain the short-term momentum and long-term reversal effect of ex-
cess stock returns.(puzzle (v), (vi)) The simulation also shows significant first-order
autocorrelation of bond prices.(puzzle (vii)) Figure 1 shows significant short-term
momentum and long-term reversal effect of excess stock returns. Figure 2 shows a
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Figure 3.2. Auto-correlation of one period interest rate
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Equity premium puzzle
We compare the first four moments of excess stock returns of the data from
Shiller (2015), the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model, and our model. Our simulation
exhibits a much higher equity premium than the baseline model of Mehra and Prescott
(1985), (puzzle (i)) It also has a higher second (puzzle (ii)) and fourth (puzzle (iii))
moment of excess stock returns than the baseline model and the data. The results
are displayed in Table 1.
Table 3.1. Excess stock return moments
Mean Volatility Skewness Kurtosis
Data 5.36% 20.21% -0.76 2.90
Model 4.45% 37.72% 1.12 4.85
Baseline 2.01% 14.58% 0.03 1.08
Notes: The data are from Shiller (2015)’s calculation for the United States 1871-2015.
Aggregate return predictability
We compare the predictability of excess stock returns with dividend price
rations of the data from Gabiax (2012), the Mehra and Prescott (1985) model, and our
model. Our simulation shows similar slop and R2 with the data, significantly better
than the baseline model of Mehra and Prescott (1985).(puzzle (iv)) The interest rate
has a much lower predictability of the excess stock return.(puzzle (x)) The results are
displayed in Table 2.
High trading volume
Our model exhibits significantly higher trading volumes than many other het-
erogeneous agents models, the bond position shits hand between agents every time
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Table 3.2. Prediction excess stock returns with the dividend/price ratio
Slope s.e. R2
Data 0.11 (0.053) 0.04
Model 0.15 (0.012) 0.03
Baseline 0.06 (0.017) 0.00
Notes: The data are from Gabiax (2012, Table IV)’s calculation for the United
States 1891-1997.
the excess return switches signs. This contributes to explain regularities stated in
Hong and Stein (2007). Also, the high trading volume co-moves with extreme re-
turns. This is consistent with Hong and Stein (2007). Although the co-movement
exists, our model shows no forecasting power of the trading volume since the high
trading volume and extreme returns always appear on the same period.
Asset price bubble and market crashes
Our simulations shows the price dividend ratios can get very high, which can
be seen as a sign of asset price bubbles. With different parameter values, the model
can provide the effect of asset price bubbles and market crashes, the speculator keeps
on shorting on bond and speculate on the positive excess returns, this will drive
the price up. Yet with the price getting higher and higher, the consumption of the
speculator will eventually go up. When the high consumption of the speculator causes




Our model shows that technical analysis can be effective with incomplete fi-
nancial markets. The traditional theory usually predicts no effectiveness of technical
analysis. In our simulation, we showed the momentum strategy can be self-justified
in equilibrium. This opens the gate to studies of other kinds of technical indexes
to see if other technical trading strategies can generate the effects they predict in
equilibrium.
Conclusions
This paper provides a simple model that can generate short-term momentum
and long-term reversal of excess stock returns. The calibrated simulation also con-
tributes to solving many asset pricing puzzles. The paper can be seen an application
of Geng (2018). It provides a new view on the heterogeneity of agents. Former papers
of heterogeneous agents usually focus on idiosyncratic shocks, asymmetric informa-
tion, or different beliefs about the exogenous shocks. This paper shows that the
agents may differ in the decision policy when all types of agents have subjective be-
liefs. The paper also opens the gate to study what kind of policies can be self-justified
in equilibrium. This can be seen as a theoretical foundation for agent-based models.
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Conclusion
My contribution to the first paper is the model without aggregate uncertainty
but with bankruptcy and default and prove existence of a steady state equilibrium.
The second paper provides a general way of modeling bounded rationality. Yet,
many aspects of behavior economics literature cannot be incorporated, especially the
findings about preferences such as loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting. we prove
the existence of the recursive equilibrium in a dynamic stochastic model with bounded
rational agents. This set up is realistic when the economy is large and complex, which
is a fact for a lot of markets. A large and complex economy would affect the agents
in two ways: first, each agent would rely on recursive methods to optimize utility;
second, each agent cannot solve for the stationary equilibrium analytically and has
to approximate an equilibrium distribution.
The entire part of constructing a continuous value function does not put extra
assumptions on the model, it provides one additional interpretation of what the ratio-
nality is bounded by – that is, the agent’s choices are continuous in the information
she observes. This is consistent with the philosophical principles stated in Maskin
and Tirole (2001). Also, the continuous value function is analogous to the continuity
assumption of the utility function in the static exchange economy models.
Although relatively abstract, this model has the potential to explore dynamic
economic models further in multiple ways. First, it may provide foundation for many
algorithms computing general equilibrium models. As we stated before, examples like
the computationally part of Krusell and Smith (1998) and Kubler and Schmedders
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(2003) can be incorporated into my set up. Second, it may generate interesting
economic processes from standard set up. As we can see from the proof, although
the equilibrium is recursive, the Markov process of the whole economy may not be
ergodic. This may provide a new angle to study business cycles and financial crisis
from a standard model set up. Third, it provides a new dimension of heterogeneity
among agents, i.e. they may use different heuristics. And last, it contributes to
finding a general theory of bounded rationality.
I further justifies the above remarks using calibrated simulations in the third
paper. This paper provides a simple model that can generate short-term momentum
and long-term reversal of excess stock returns. The calibrated simulation also con-
tributes to solving many asset pricing puzzles. The paper can be seen an application
of the second paper. It provides a new view on the heterogeneity of agents. Former
papers of heterogeneous agents usually focus on idiosyncratic shocks, asymmetric in-
formation, or different beliefs about the exogenous shocks. This paper shows that the
agents may differ in the decision policy when all types of agents have subjective be-
liefs. The paper also opens the gate to study what kind of policies can be self-justified
in equilibrium. This can be seen as a theoretical foundation for agent-based models.
